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ABSTRACT 
An abstract of the thesis of Anthony David Lott for the 
Master of Arts in Political Science presented July 12, 
1996. 
Title: Neorealism and Environmental Cooperation: 
Towards a Structural Explanation of 
International Environmental Matters 
The realist tradition in world politics has long been 
heralded by statesmen and scholars alike as offering an 
authentic account of the relations between states. 
Realists consider self-interest, anarchy, and power 
politics to guide the behavior of states in the 
international system. The perception that cooperation and 
amity are now the norm in the international system has 
raised the possibility of a theoretical shift of focus in 
the study of international politics. At present, scholars 
within the discipline of international politics are 
debating the relevance of realist thought. In particular, 
neorealism, or the structural variation of traditional 
realism, is under attack for not providing a rationale for 
international cooperation. 
This project undertakes to expand neorealism's 
ability to explain state behavior in the area of 
environmental cooperation. Employing the notion of 
anarchy as a self-help system, it shall be demonstrated 
that international environmental agreements appear to be 
influenced by the distribution of power in the 
international system. Anarchy mandates the need for state 
actors to cooperate on certain environmental issues, while 
that same system dissuades cooperation on a number of 
other important environmental matters. 
This thesis critiques the theoretical principles in 
neorealism and makes moderate changes to them. In keeping 
with neorealist thought, power, the interests of important 
states, and the position of the hegemon are considered 
important factors in understanding environmental 
cooperation. This project also studies three global 
environmental issues that provide insight into the rewards 
and limitations of using neorealism to explain 
cooperation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The realist tradition in world politics has long been 
heralded by statesmen and scholars alike as offering an 
authentic account of the relations between states. 
Thucydides, exploring the roots of conflict between 
ancient Athens and Sparta, pointed to the inevitable 
growth of power and self-interest as a cause of war. 1 
Niccolo Machiavelli suggested prudent leaders ought to 
resort to imperialism and war. Anarchy, he suggested, 
requires the prince to violate ethical principles in 
defense of the state. 2 Thomas Hobbes acknowledged that 
international anarchy produces a disposition towards 
competition and war. 3 In 19th century Prussia, Otto von 
Bismarck and Carl von Clausewitz legitimized the use of 
war as an extension of diplomacy. 4 
Twentieth-century realists have continued the 
tradition. Studying Germany's rise to power in the years 
prior to W.W.II, E.H. Carr condemns the appeasement 
philosophy of many European nations. 5 Hans Morgenthau 
reminds the student of world politics that power and self-
interest lie at the heart of the state. 6 Hedley Bull 
suggests an underlying logic to anarchy and warns against 
alternative world organizations. 7 
This pessimistic view of the political struggle 
between states depicts the foundation upon which realism, 
as the dominant paradigm in international relations 
theory, rests. It characterizes the anarchic environment 
as a struggle for power by self-interested, sovereign 
states. International politics is competitive, war-prone, 
and brutal. Conflict is the norm, and cooperation, the 
exception. 8 
Others suggest this view is too pessimistic. They 
contend that cooperation appears to develop relatively 
easily among self-interested states. 9 Wars, although 
possible, are interrupted by long periods of amicable 
relations between states. Cooperation consistently occurs 
in the form of accepted legal norms, economic agreements, 
and international humanitarian missions. 10 
Theorists who stress cooperation and order are 
inclined toward a more benign picture of international 
2 
politics, quite removed from the traditional realist 
perspective. At the end of W.W.I, liberal statesmen and 
scholars envisioned that politics in the future would be 
marked by concord and "perpetual peace." 11 Leaders after 
W.W.II established the United Nations and proclaimed a new 
era for humankind.u As economic cooperation progressed 
through the 1970's, "neoliberal institutionalism" examined 
the rise of institutions (international organizations, 
regimes, and other supranational entities) as a means of 
ensuring global cooperation. 13 These neoliberals 
proclaimed that a paradigm shift was occurring, and 
announced their institutional perspective as the new 
candidate. 14 
Which view correctly described world politics? Could 
realist philosophy maintain its 2000 year old tradition of 
dominance? Realists of various persuasions attempted to 
bolster the state-centric, power-politics model. Rebuffed 
by the continuous attacks of institutionalists, it 
appeared that a fundamental change in the study of the 
global system was underway. Finally, Kenneth Waltz 
introduced a systemic theory of international politics. 15 
3 
Termed, neorealism, Waltz's account of the politics 
between nations borrowed a structural framework from 
oligopolistic theory in economics. 16 
Traditional realist thought, according to Waltz, was 
reductionist. It reduced the study of international 
relations to the internal attributes of the state or the 
psychological make-up of the citizenry. 11 Reliance on 
ideas such as "human nature," "national character," and 
"legal ideals, 1118 all point to discussions around states 
and their internal characteristics. For, Waltz, such 
theories could not adequately explain state behavior. 
Therefore, in Theory of International Politics, he applied 
a systemic approach to the study of international 
relations. Analogous to oligopic market theory, where 
competition and self-help reign, Waltz's theory was a 
marked change from the traditional realist school. The 
discipline was introduced to new concepts, like system and 
structure. 19 Systems are conceptual tools that theorists 
use to study actors. 20 A system is a "set of interacting 
units. 1121 Structures are bounded realms of actors. As 
4 
defined by Waltz, the international structure consists of 
states, varying in strength, interacting in anarchy. 22 
For many in the discipline, neorealism rose from the 
ashes of traditional realist thought and reclaimed the 
title of dominant paradigm. By maintaining the importance 
of power, anarchy, self-interest, and the state, 
neorealism would be indelibly linked to its predecessor. 
However, with its systemic dimension, it would be powerful 
enough to explain economic cooperation. Subsequent 
attempts at explaining these matters by employing 
neorealist theory met with critical success. 23 Combined 
with the traditional realist ability to explain discord, 
neorealism appeared able to stave off the 
institutionalists. 
Ironically, in the same decade that bore neorealism, 
several international environmental agreements were signed 
introducing the emergence of a new issue area in the study 
of international relations. 24 The increasing salience of 
environmental issues has provided many theorists with the 
opportunity to raise the specter of a paradigm shift once 
again. 25 Institutionalists now claim that the 
5 
oligopolistic analogy in neorealism, tolerable for 
explaining economic matters, does not sufficiently explain 
environmental cooperation. 26 
Various institutional theories have attempted to 
account for the relative success of many prominent 
international environmental agreements. 27 Individually 
and collectively, these works provide a strong counter-
response to neorealism. 28 Currently, it appears that the 
discipline is once again wrought with paradigm 
competition. Awkward claims that issues such as 
environmental cooperation matter little in a world 
dominated by nuclear weapons, 29 only add to neoliberal 
claims. Consider, for example, that Kenneth Waltz's 
seminal piece, Theory of International Politics, lacks any 
in-depth mention of environmental issues. 30 
This project undertakes to expand neorealism's 
ability to explain state behavior in the area of 
environmental cooperation. I seek to demonstrate that 
international environmental agreements appear to be 
influenced by the distribution of power in the 
international system. 31 Specifically, I contend that the 
6 
international anarchical structure, and its ramifications 
for state actors, sufficiently explains the success or 
failure of international environmental agreements. 
Anarchy, described as a self-help system, 32 mandates the 
need for state actors to cooperate on certain 
environmental issues, while that same system dissuades 
cooperation on a number of other important environmental 
matters. As states seek to survive in the anarchical 
order, cooperation, often more apparent than real, 33 is 
engendered. 
In order to construct a structural explanation of 
environmental cooperation, I shall first critique the 
institutionalists' perspective. This will provide insight 
into the limited ability of neoliberalism to account for 
environmental cooperation. Further, this critique will 
suggest a more modest role for international institutions, 
a role that can be explained through the lens of 
neorealism. 
Second, I will enhance the current ability of 
neorealism to account for cooperation. Frequent attacks 
on the paradigm suggest that its deterministic structure34 
7 
does not allow for a great deal of cooperative behavior. 
In response to such criticisms, I shall present a 
theoretical case for understanding cooperation through the 
lens of neorealism. 
Finally, a structural explanation of environmental 
cooperation will be developed. By surveying a number of 
successful and unsuccessful environmental agreements, it 
will be demonstrated that great powers, in order to ensure 
their sovereign integrity, exercise their ability to 
influence and co-opt other states. Consequently, less 
powerful states remain as incapable of influence on 
environmental issues as they are in military and strategic 
arenas. 
8 
NOTES 
1 Thucydides (c. 400 B.C.), The History of the 
Peloponnesian War, trans. and ed. Rex Warner (Baltimore: 
Penquin Classics, 1954). 
2 Niccolo Machiavelli (1532), The Discourses, ed. Bernard 
Crick, trans. Leslie J. Walker (Baltimore: Penquin 
Classics, 1976); and Niccolo Machiavelli (1513), ~ 
Prince, trans. Harvey Mansfield, Jr. (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1985). 
Thomas Hobbes (1651), Leviathan: Or the Matter. Forme. 
and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Ciyil, ed. 
Michael Oakeshott (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 
1962) I PP• 98-102. 
4 Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis. 1919-
.JJU...2. (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1964): 109. 
Ibid., generally; and Hans Morgenthau makes much the 
same point in Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The 
Struggle for Power and Peace, brief edition (New York: 
McGraw Hill, 1993): 6. 
6 Morgenthau, p. 5 and p. 13. 
7 Hedley Bull, The Ailarchic Society: A Study of Order in 
World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1977). 
Robert G. Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of 
Political Realism," in Robert 0. Keohane, ed., Neorealism 
and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1986): 304. 
Robert Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations 
Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate," International 
Organization 48 (Spring 1994): 328. 
10 Robert 0. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and 
Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1984): 49-64; Mark W. Zacher, 
9 
"Toward a Theory of International Regimes," in Robert L. 
Rothstein, ed., The Evolution of Theory in International 
Relations (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina 
Press, 1992): 119-137. 
11 I borrow this phase from Immanuel Kant (1795), 
"Perpetual Peace," in Kant's Political Writings, ed. Hans 
Riess, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1971). Perhaps the best example of this is Woodrow 
Wilson, "The World Must be Made Safe for Democracy and the 
Fourteen Points," in John A. Vasquez, ed., Classics of 
International Relations, 3rd. ed. (New Jersey: Prentice 
Hall, 1996), pp. 35-40. 
12 
13 Ernst B. Haas, "On Systems and International Regimes," 
World Politics 27 (January 1975): 147-74; Ernst B. Haas, 
Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International 
Organization (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964). 
14 Richard W. Mansbach and John A Vasquez, In Search of 
Theory: A New Paradigm for Global Politics (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1981): 68-83. 
15 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New 
York: Random House, 1979). 
16 Ibid., p. 89-93. 
17 Ibid., p. 19. 
18 Theorists that employ these notions include, 
Morgenthau, pp. 143-147; Hobbes, pp. 98-102; and Reinhold 
Neibuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study of Ethics 
and Politics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932). 
19 Waltz, p. 79. 
20 Ibid. I p. 80. 
21 Ibid. I p. 40. 
IO 
22 Ibid., pp. 88-101. 
23 Three works on economic cooperation that utilize 
Neorealism include, Robert Gilpin, War and Change in 
International Politics (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981); Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The 
Third World Against Global Liberalism (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1985); David Lake, Power. 
Protection. and Free Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 1988). 
24 This should not appear as a comprehensive and 
exhaustive list of international environmental agreements. 
For a more comprehensive list, see Edith Brown Weiss, Paul 
C. Czasz, and Daniel P. Magraw, International 
Environmental Law; Basic Instruments and References. (USA: 
Transnational Publishers Inc., 1992). Some of the more 
notable agreements include: Stockholm Declaration on the 
Human Environment of the United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment, 16 June 1972, reprinted in 11 ILM 1416 
(1972) . UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of 
the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 16 November 1972, 
reprinted in 11 ILM 1358 (1972). United States of 
America- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Agreement on 
Co-operation in the Field of Environmental Protection, 23 
May 1972, reprinted in 11 ILM 761 (1972). Nordic 
Convention on the Protection of the Environment and 
Protocol, 19 February 1974, reprinted in 13 ILM 591 
(1974). Brussels International Convention relating to 
Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution 
Causalities, 29 November 1969, reprinted in 970 UNTS 211. 
London Protocol relating to Intervention on the High Seas 
in Cases of Marine Pollution by Substances other than Oil, 
2 November 1973, reprinted in 13 ILM 605 (1974). Brussels 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage, 19 December 1971, reprinted in 11 ILM 
284 (1972) . IMO Convention on the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (London 
Dumping Convention-LDC), 29 December 1972, reprinted in 11 
ILM 1294 (1972). London International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) 2 November 
11 
1972, reprinted in 12 ILM 1319 (1973). Oslo Convention 
for the Prevention of Pollution of Marine Pollution By 
Dumping from Ships and Aircraft, 15 February 1972, 
reprinted in 11 ILM 262 (1972) . Paris Convention for the 
Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources, 4 
June 1974, reprinted in 13 ILM 352 (1974). Gdansk 
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources 
in the Baltic Sea and The Belts, 13 September 1973, 
reprinted in 12 ILM 1291 (1973). Barcelona Convention for 
the Protection of the Mediterranean against Pollution, 16 
February 1976, reprinted in 15 ILM 290 (1976). Convention 
of International Liability for Damage Caused by Space 
Objects, 29 March 1972, reprinted in 961 UNTS 187. 
Washington Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES), 3 March 1973, 
reprinted in 12 ILM 1088 (1973). London Convention for 
the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, 1 June 1972, 
reprinted in 11 ILM 251 (1972) . Oslo Agreement on the 
Conservation of Polar Bears, 15 November 1973, reprinted 
in 13 ILM 13 (1973). Ranger Convention on Wetlands of 
International Importance, Especially as Waterfowl Habitat, 
2 February 1971, reprinted in 11 ILM 969 (1972). 
25 Consider for example, Geoffrey Palmer's comment 
concerning the environment and action, "There is a 
political imperative driving environmental diplomacy. It 
is the rising level of consciousness among people 
everywhere of the serious nature of the global 
environmental problems. One can feel it in the air at the 
increasingly numerous international conferences held on 
the subject. Governments are eager to be seen as taking a 
constructive stance. It is time to translate that 
attitude into action." Geoffrey Palmer, "New Ways to Make 
International Environmental Law," Affierican Journal of 
International Law 86 (April 1992): 259. 
26 This criticism is lodged in a broader criticism that 
neorealism cannot account for cooperation generally. See 
for example, Robert O. Keohane, "Theory of World 
Politics," in Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its 
Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986): 195-
12 
197. Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little, ~ 
Logic of Anarchy (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1993): 150-153. Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure 
Problem in International Relations Theory," International 
Organization 41 (Summer 1987): 335-370. 
27 Consider for example, Peter Haas, Saying the 
Mediterranean, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1990). Peter Haas, "Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: 
Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect Stratospheric 
Ozone," International Organization 46 (Winter 1992): 187. 
Peter H. Sand, "Institutions for Global Change: Whither 
Environmental Governance?," Policy Studies Journal 19 
(Spring 1991): 93-102. 
28 To contend that political realism, and in particular 
neorealism, is the dominant paradigm in international 
relations theory is not without its critics. However, as 
Robert Keohane states, "For over 2000 years, what Hans J. 
Morgenthau dubbed 'Political Realism' has constituted the 
principle tradition for the analysis of international 
relations in Europe and its offshoot in the New World." 
see Keohane, "Theory of World Politics," p. 158; and 
Buzan, Jones, and Little, p 1. 
29 Waltz, p. 139. 
30 The only mention of the environment appears in a 
summary of what other theorists consider interdependence 
among states, "The four p's- pollution, poverty, 
population, and proliferation- pose problems so pressing 
that national interest must be subordinated to collective 
need." Waltz, p. 139. 
31 For a general description of what the international 
system level of analysis entails see, Martin Hollis and 
Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International 
Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990): 92-118. 
32 Waltz, p. 111. 
13 
33 This term is taken from Lewis Alexander's discussion 
of cooperation by states concerning maritime conventions. 
He states, "Regarding cooperative action among individual 
states in ocean activities, there often seem to be more 
examples of appearance than of reality." Lewis M. 
Alexander, "The Cooperative Approach to Ocean Affairs: 
Twenty Years Later," Ocean Deyelopment and International 
Lfil:l 21 (1990): 108. 
34 Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Debate." 
14 
INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATIONS OF COOPERATION 
In the wake of a series of devastating oil spills 
like that of the Torrey Canyon, and popular protest 
movements like the inaugural Earth Day of 1971, 1 the 
highly charged environmental debate entered the academic 
arena. Significant works appeared by highly praised 
scholars denouncing the self-destructive path of humankind 
and prescribing radical alternatives. In 1971, Richard 
Falk published This Endangered Planet. 2 This provocative 
look at the effect humanity has on the global ecosystem 
suggested the extreme measures that the species must take 
in order to survive. 3 Richard Heilbroner, R. Buckminster 
Fuller, and others4 voiced similar opinions in response to 
the perceived imminent doom facing humankind. 
These early texts on the subject of the international 
environment seem indelibly linked to the historical period 
in which they were created. The psycho milieu5 of the 
authors is colored by suggestions that the extinction of 
the species was forthcoming. This should not detract from 
15 
their worth as outstanding intellectual achievements in 
raising the collective conscience of humankind in order to 
deal with serious environmental issues. 
Nevertheless, these highly normative early works gave 
way to more cautious analyses as the accumulation of 
cooperative agreements increased at a rapid rate through 
the 1970s. 6 More recent research on the environment has 
involved close scrutiny of these agreements.' With 
recourse to data, theorists were able to establish 
explanations of how and why cooperation, on a variety of 
complex and difficult environmental matters, was possible. 
Further, these more empirical works suggest that humankind 
can achieve a reasonable degree of environmental integrity 
without radical systemic change. The resulting collection 
represents a strong counter-response to the radical 
economic and political alternatives expressed in the early 
writings. 8 
In 1977, Hedley Bull published a classic study of 
international politics entitled The Anarchical Society. 9 
This inquiry into order and stability in the international 
16 
arena suggests the importance of the state in minimizing 
international conflict. 10 
Unlike the early environmental theorists, who 
suggested that order and cooperation must come at the 
expense of the state, 11 Bull argues that the nation-state 
system is an integral, indeed the integral, component of 
order. Applying this logic to environmental issues, Bull 
suggests that the current state-centric system is the only 
political structure presently able to deal with 
environmental threats. Concurring with Shields and Ott, 12 
Hedley Bull notes that "it is only national governments 
that have the information, the experience and the 
resources to act effectively in relation to these 
matters." 13 This analysis, then, provides a foundation 
for studies on environmental cooperation that acknowledge 
the importance of the nation-state system. 
Both neoliberals and neorealists agree on the primacy 
of the state in international politics. 14 This is welcome 
relief for a great many theorists. The similarity allows 
for a more genuine comparison of the institutional role 
within each paradigm. 
17 
Peter Haas, Robert Keohane, and Marc Levy provide a 
thorough discussion of the state in their recent 
compilation of articles under the rubric Institutions for 
the Earth. 15 In the introductory chapter, these theorists 
concern themselves with the importance of the nation-state 
in establishing international environmental cooperation. 
They suggest that institutions, which may take the form of 
organizations, regimes, or conventions, 16 do not 
supersede or overshadow states. They lack the 
resources to enforce their edicts. To be 
effective, they must create networks over, 
around, and within states that generate the 
means and the incentives for cooperation among 
those states. 17 
These neoliberals emphasize their pragmatic nature, 18 
and argue throughout their analyses that the state is 
integral to cooperative ventures. This state-centric 
approach adheres closely to theoretical principles in 
neorealism. Kenneth Waltz is quick to point out the 
presence of international processes in his own theory. 19 
Process results from state interaction within the 
international system. For Waltz, processes take the form 
of rules, institutions, and organizations. 20 Processes 
18 
are vibrant entities in international politics. But, like 
the neoliberals, Waltz considers their presence in 
cooperative ventures to be secondary to the primary actors 
in the system. He argues, 
States set the scene in which they, along with 
nonstate actors, stage their dramas or carry on 
their humdrum affairs. Though they may choose 
to interfere little in the affairs of nonstate 
actors for long periods of time, states 
nevertheless set the terms of the intercourse, 
whether by passively permitting informal rules 
to develop or by actively intervening to change 
rules that no longer suit them. When the crunch 
comes, states remake the rules by which other 
actors operate. 21 
An almost identical viewpoint of the relationship 
between institutional processes and the state is expressed 
in Institutions for the Earth. Haas, Keohane, and Levy 
suggest that international institutions perform three 
crucial functions that "have contributed to more effective 
national efforts to protect the quality of the global 
environment. 1122 Coining these elements "the three C's," 
the authors note that institutions increase government 
concern, enhance the contractual environment, and increase 
national capacity. 23 Having expressed this opinion, they 
concede that, 
19 
if the rules and practices of international 
institutions are inconsistent with realities of 
power or ecology, they may become meaningless; 
and if their content creates perverse 
incentives, they may do more harm than good. 24 
The limits of institutions are correctly demarcated 
by these authors. They emphasize the mirroring effect 
that institutions have with power relationships in the 
international system. John Mearsheimer, writing in the 
realist tradition, allows that states do utilize 
institutions, however he is quick to point to the power 
relationship as well, 
Realists also recognize that states sometimes 
operate through institutions. However, they 
believe that those rules reflect state 
calculations of self-interest based primarily on 
the international distribution of power. The 
most powerful states in the system create and 
shape institutions so that they can maintain 
their share of world power, or even increase it. 
In this view, institutions are essentially 
'arenas for acting out power relationships." 25 
Other theorists who argue from the institutional 
perspective are open about the power dimension in 
international politics. Oran Young suggests that the 
creation of international regimes is often done in the 
presence of, and with the encouragement of, an 
20 
international hegemon. 26 "Imposed regimes, " 27 are a 
classic example of "power politics" manifested in an 
international process. These regimes are "fostered 
deliberately by dominant powers or a consortia of dominant 
powers." 28 Because the capability differential is so 
great, less powerful states are compelled through "some 
combination of coercion, cooptation, and manipulation of 
incentives," 29 to obey the informal rules of the regime. 
Karen Litfin echoes the regime analysis of Oran 
Young. She contends that regimes play an increasingly 
important role in the development of international 
environmental solutions. 30 However, she still considers 
the state to be the primary international actor, 
Only the state has the human and financial 
resources to mount the large-scale scientific 
and technical projects for detecting, 
monitoring, and preserving the global 
environment. 31 
Neoliberals have also witnessed power manifested in 
institutions while studying epistemic communities. In 
1990, Peter Haas published Saving the Mediterranean. 32 
This book was a compilation of research dedicated to 
understanding why Mediterranean states cooperated with 
21 
each other in solving marine pollution problems. 
According to Haas, the motivating force behind 
Mediterranean cooperation has been the "epistemic 
community." 33 This community is a professional group 
drawn from many different scientific disciplines. 34 The 
members all share a common world view and a willingness 
and desire to promote such values. 35 Haas suggests that 
beyond their similar scientific history, these members 
share a 'consensual knowledge' about how to solve 
problems. 36 
Although Haas considers the international scientific 
community to have been the motivating force in 
establishing the MEDPlan agreements, he adds important 
qualif ers concerning the power distribution in the 
Mediterranean region. Acknowledging France's pre-eminent 
role as an economic hegemon for many Mediterranean basin 
countries, he concedes that, 
Without active French participation, no efforts 
to clean up the Mediterranean could hope to 
succeed. Since the developing countries were 
more dependent on French trade for contributions 
to their GNP than France was dependent on them, 
French negotiators were in a better position to 
coerce compliance from LDC diplomats by way of 
tacit threats of unilaterally implementing new 
22 
policies to control pollution. Thus, France 
could expect to create pollution control 
arrangements which would satisfy French 
concerns. 37 
Haas, turning his attention to the ozone depletion 
issue, finds similar results with regard to United States 
hegemony. 38 Arguing once again that epistemic analysis 
provides a rich explanation of cooperation, Haas concedes 
that U.S. influence was a necessary pre-condition for that 
cooperation. 39 
Legal institutionalists also maintain the primacy of 
the state and the importance of the power distribution in 
international environmental agreements. 40 While 
introducing his edited volume, Greening International 
Law, 41 Philippe Sands acknowledges that states "continue 
to play the primary and dominant role in the international 
legal order, both as principal creators of the rules of 
international law and the principal holders of the rights 
and obligations under those rules." 42 
So far, it would appear that neoliberals and 
neorealists share similar views with regard to the 
importance of both the state and power in the 
23 
international system. Nothing, to this point, in the 
discussion of institutions by neoliberals contradicts the 
theoretical principles in neorealism. States remain the 
key actors and institutions provide scientific information 
and enhance the negotiating arena. Indeed, Charles Glaser 
has pointed out that neorealists have no problem with 
institutions that merely reduce transaction costs and 
provide information. 43 This type of institutional 
analysis maintains the logic of neorealism. "States remain 
the key actors, and anarchy remains unchanged; from this 
perspective, the role played by these institutions is 
modest. " 44 According to Glaser, 
If institutions of this type would make 
cooperation desirable, then structural realism 
predicts that states would create them for 
essentially the same reason that under certain 
conditions they should pursue advances in 
technology or increases in force size: these 
policies would enhance their military 
capabilities. 45 
However, most neoliberals prescribe a more active 
role for the institution in developing international 
environmental cooperation. 46 Here, a theoretical split 
begins to take place. Increasingly, the view of the state 
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as a passive participant in the institutional process 
becomes clear. 
This seriously undermines the importance of the state 
and counters much of the self-help logic of neorealism. 
Accordingly, many institutional analyses seek to explain 
international environmental cooperation as the result of 
regimes, organizations, and epistemic communities. 47 
Karen Litfin provides an excellent example of just such an 
explanation. She asserts, 
scientists and social movements have instigated 
virtually all existing international 
environmental agreements, and in many cases were 
key actors in their negotiation, implementation, 
and monitoring. Moreover, these non-state 
actors are infusing new rules, processes, and 
norms into both new and existing social 
structures. 48 
Peter Haas, whose earlier discussion of French 
hegemony in the MEDPlan, suggested a realist bias, moves 
away from the state-centric approach and insists that 
The epistemic community approach offers 
suggestions for more resilient cooperation that 
is broader in scope than that anticipated by 
realists, neorealists, and historical 
materialists. 49 
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Thus, the true explanation for successful 
environmental cooperation in the Mediterranean basin 
results from the active involvement of the international 
epistemic community. Neorealists become uneasy as this 
explanation of cooperation unfolds. This group, composed 
of "bureaucrats, technocrats, scientists, and 
specialists, " 50 must consider themselves members of that 
community a priori their role as government officials. 
Maintaining the importance of the state, realists argue 
that these individuals are members of the apparatus known 
as the state. 51 
Categorizing these individuals as members of the 
state, proffers an opposing explanation of their behavior. 
As state agents these individuals have a desire to 
maximize state interests. 52 The cooperative activities 
they engage in result from an understanding that 
environmental degradation can diminish the economic and 
aesthetic interests of the state. Realists insist that 
the international system reflects this notion. States 
have not given up regulatory authority to international 
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organizations and the monitoring functions of these 
organizations are quite limited. 53 
Further evidence of neoliberalism's intent to move 
away from the state as the primary actor is provided by 
the work of Haas, Keohane, and Levy. 54 Originally 
introducing themselves as pragmatists, their subsequent 
discussions seed the institutional dimension with an 
activist aire. In order to be effective, they suggest, 
institutions must "create networks over, around, and 
within states that generate the means and the incentives 
for cooperation among those states." 55 Institutions are 
given an international personality that makes the 
neorealist uncomfortable. John Mearsheimer, perhaps an 
extreme critic of the role of institutions, defends the 
realist argument succinctly, 
Realists maintain that institutions are 
basically a reflection of the distribution of 
power in the world. They are based on self-
interested calculations of the great powers, and 
they have no independent effect on state 
behavior. 56 
While Mearsheimer is over-exuberant in his disdain of 
institutions, he is not completely at fault. Neoliberals 
27 
provide him with the impetus for such a harsh critique by 
implying that the state is either impotent to, or unaware 
of, forces driving institutional fabrication.~ 
Institutions are better understood if the they occupy 
a more modest role in a theory of international politics. 
Reformulating Haas, Keohane, and Levy's discussion to 
read, states build institutional networks when the need 
for such networks appears in the interest of the state, 
provides for a more balanced account of the role of 
institutions. Institutional networks can then be 
described as a process of state activity. Additionally, 
these processes will more accurately reflect the power 
distribution and the desires of states. 
By discounting the notion of self-interest in the 
international system, neoliberal analyses often paint too 
optimistic a picture of international cooperation. Self-
interest and anarchy provide neorealism with an 
explanation of state behavior. Notions such as these, 
provide answers as to why environmental cooperation 
occurs. Finding an explanation for cooperation, 
neorealists can then enhance their theory by describing 
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how that cooperation is formalized. Institutions provide 
just such an enhancement. Neoliberals appear to confuse 
the descriptive with the explanatory. 
Perhaps some examples will shed some light on the 
problem created by neoliberals. Consider the recent 
attempt to develop a comprehensive and thorough set of 
legal agreements to deal with climate change. In early 
1991, officials from over 100 countries met in Washington 
D.C. to convene the United Nations Intergovernmental 
Negotiating Committee on Climate Change (INC) . 58 States 
concerned with rising sea levels and atmospheric change 
used the forum to voice their opinions and lament the 
uncooperative behavior of major world powers. 59 
The most active group of states involved in this 
issue, provides evidence of why a comprehensive set of 
agreements has not been created. Known as the Alliance of 
Small Island States, 60 a host of nations in the Pacific, 
Indian, and Atlantic Oceans61 continuously demand action. 
For neorealists, their overwhelming lack of power points 
to their subsequent inability to achieve cooperation. 
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However, for neoliberals focusing on the 
institutional process, this group is described quite 
differently. Oran Young suggests that the Alliance has 
achieved "real success within the INC."~ He considers 
that, "[b]ecause the concerns of its members are so 
palpable and because the group has attracted the help of 
sophisticated advisors from the NGOs, the Alliance of 
Small Island States has proven effective in the climate 
negotiations, despite the weakness of its members in 
material terms. " 63 
Young seems to confuse internal institutional 
cooperation among a variety of weak states and NGOs, with 
international environmental cooperation. There is an 
implicit desire to establish non-governmental 
organizations as influential in promoting cooperation. 
However, what does it matter if the Alliance has proven 
effective in the negotiations, if the negotiations do not 
result in success? Young concedes that, "there is no way 
to check global warming without the active participation 
of the developing countries."" It pays to look beyond an 
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institutional perspective to understand cooperation or 
lack thereof. 
Recourse to simple and rather unattractive principles 
such as anarchy and sufficient self-interest, 65 prove more 
valuable than institutional explanations. That 
negotiations take place, and cursory scientific data is 
collected, does not point to an impending set of 
environmental agreements. There is confusion created in 
using institutions as explanations of why cooperation 
takes place. Much the same occurs in an institutional 
analysis of the MEDPlan. 
Throughout the 1970's, the newly formed United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) assisted in the 
creation and maintenance of a regime to ensure the 
environmental integrity of the Mediterranean Sea from a 
host of pollutants. 66 Hailed as the "flagship" of UNEP' s 
Regional Seas Initiatives, 67 the MEDPlan68 is considered a 
resounding success for the institutional model of 
cooperation. 
According to many in the academic and public-policy 
communities, this set of agreements represents a 
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"brilliant invention and a new contribution to the 
resources of diplomacy. " 69 If these experts are correct, 
then why have UNEP's other Regional Seas Initiatives not 
qualified as similar successes? After all, from the 
institutional perspective, all necessary components for 
cooperation should be present. Indeed, subsequent 
agreements should be easier since the institutional 
infrastructure is already in place. All things being 
equal, agreements to protect the Red Sea, the Persian 
Gulf, the Caribbean, etc. 70 should be relatively simple. 
Unfortunately, subsequent agreements have largely 
been cosmetic and have not involved measures necessary for 
even limited environmental protection. Tony Brenton 
discusses the merits of UNEP's efforts as well as its 
limitations, 
The scale of this programme, and the number of 
countries involved, is impressive evidence of 
UNEP's ability to pull regional groupings of 
countries together to discuss, and sign 
agreements on, their local marine pollution 
problems .... It is a great deal less clear, 
however, how much the Regional Seas Programme 
has actually done to begin to reverse marine 
pollution, or to what extent it reveals a 
willingness on the part of the participants to 
make economic sacrifices to that end. With one 
exception, the programmes undertaken so far seem 
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largely to be confined to generalized 
expressions of the need to tackle pollution ... 
There is little evidence of the emergence of 
concrete regional programmes and standards 
intended to cut polluting discharges into the 
marine environment. 71 
Ironically, it is unclear that the exception noted by 
Brenton, the MEDPlan, has been as effective as many 
authors insist. 72 Recent analysis of the MEDPlan suggests 
that although it 
is a model of success at getting disparate 
states to come together to create legal 
documents for the protection of the environment, 
it may be considered less successful in getting 
the parties to those documents to adopt and 
implement policies that would actually carry out 
the plan envisioned by the Convention and 
subsequent Protocols." 73 
Neoliberals seem unable to answer why there is a 
discrepancy between envisioned and actual cooperation. By 
endowing the institution with a significant amount of 
agency, their analysis should suggest no difference in the 
level of cooperation called for by the international legal 
framework and the level witnessed in the international 
system. 
On the other hand, by prescribing only a modest role 
for the institution, neorealists need not be concerned 
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with this discrepancy. Maintaining the primacy of the 
state, allows for an explanation of the level of 
cooperation achieved, and a rationale for the difference 
between envisioned and actual cooperation. Still 
maintaining that self-interest will dictate the level of 
cooperation witnessed, these theorists expect to see 
relatively modest forms of cooperation. Limited 
cooperation is a result of self-interest in an anarchic 
environment. 74 States are not willing to involve 
themselves in strict regulations that compromise their 
drive to maintain capabilities. 75 
This appears to answer why a lower level of 
cooperation is achieved than initially called for by the 
formal agreement. However, it still remains a mystery as 
to why, since states have control over institutions, there 
should ever be a higher level of envisioned cooperation. 
It is important to remember Waltz's cautious description 
of the interaction between states and institutions. He 
recalls that states may not interfere with the activities 
of institutions for extended periods of time. 76 However, 
they "set the terms of the intercourse, whether by 
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passively permitting informal rules to develop or by 
actively intervening to change" 77 those rules. 
If there is a minor discrepancy between envisioned 
and actual cooperation, neorealists would suggest that 
states are simply not concerned with it. If this 
discrepancy were to inhibit powerful state behavior, then 
intervention into the institutional process would be 
expected. The rabid refusal by powerful states, to sign 
the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
treaty78 suggests such a scenario. Because many of the 
more 'progressive' articles79 in UNCLOS III could 
potentially diminish great power capabilities, this 
document remained unsigned by the majority of maritime 
powers. 80 The envisioned cooperation in UNCLOS went 
beyond the actual level that these states were willing to 
adopt. Before the agreement was signed, post hoc 
negotiations were required that lessened the discrepancy 
between envisioned and actual cooperation. 
Many neoliberal and legal scholars are unhappy with 
this explanation. They seek to demonstrate that there is 
an autonomous international personality granted to 
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institutions and legal principles. 01 For many, neorealism 
does not allow such a capacity to exist for international 
law and ins ti tut ions. 82 Anarchy, self-interest, and 
power, appear unable to sufficiently explain notions like 
sovereign equali ty83 and the doctrine of res communis. 84 
These concepts, visible in the international system, 
suggest that something other than power and self-interest 
guides the behavior of states. Neoliberalism, and many of 
the earlier realist thinkers, contend that rules, norms of 
behavior, and membership in a 'loose' international 
society allow for more robust explanations of 
international cooperation than neorealism is willing to 
allow. 85 
The force of this well-reasoned argument suggests 
reasons for accepting another paradigm in lieu of 
neorealism. However, it is also possible to include this 
argument in the neorealist paradigm. The underlying logic 
of anarchy, considered a self-help system, does not 
necessitate removing legal norms and practices. All that 
this logic suggests, is that when strategic issues 
threaten the integrity of the state, maintenance of 
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capabilities will trump considerations of legal norms and 
institutional rules. 
Kenneth Waltz's theory of international politics 
attempts to provide the discipline with a parsimonious 
theory, whose definitions are concise and whose actors 
limited to only the most important. 86 Because of this, 
roles, norms, and practices appear to be missing from his 
view of the international system. 87 This is not the case. 
Processes are accounted for in neorealism; although they 
are provided only a modest role. 
Unlike other theorists who envision the international 
structure as a legal order above the states, 88 Waltz 
considers law and institutions to be processes of state 
interaction. 89 He is quick to point out, "the difficulty 
political scientists have in keeping the distinction 
between structures and processes clearly and constantly in 
mind. 09° For Waltz, a conceptual structure can be created 
separate from process. 91 Such a structure is described as 
a self-help system. For the purposes of the theoretical 
enterprise, this structural concept is not endowed with 
legal and institutional attributes. 92 
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What benefit can result from such an abstract 
structure? Neorealism's limited theoretical principles 
allow for a clarity of explanation. Unlike many of the 
institutional analyses, Waltz's structural dimension is 
easy to understand. Although its concepts come under 
attack for various deficiencies, 93 rarely is Waltz 
considered fuzzy in his concepts. 
This is a pervasive problem with neoliberal analyses. 
It is often difficult to distinguish between an 
institution and any number of other concepts. Often, the 
institutional definition is so broad, it can be used to 
describe all interactions between states in the 
international system. Haas, Keohane, and Levy, provide an 
example of this fuzziness. The authors suggest, 
By 'institutions' we mean the persistent and 
connected sets of rules and practices that 
prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, 
and shape expectations. They may take the form 
of bureaucratic organizations, regimes (rule-
structures that do not necessarily have 
organizations attached) , or conventions 
(informal practices)." 
A similarly broad definition is employed by Steven 
Krasner in his study of regimes. Krasner notes that 
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regimes are "sets of implicit or explicit principles, 
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which 
actors' expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations." 95 
Defining institutions (or regimes) so broadly, these 
authors deflect much criticism concerning their 
discussions of cooperation. However, the question must be 
asked, what in the complex inter-relations between states 
does not fall under the authors' definition? If it is 
indeed a valuable asset for a theory to explain, and even 
predict, the behavior of states, 96 then this institutional 
analysis does little more than muddy the waters. Agreeing 
with this assessment, John Mearsheimer has stated, 
defining institutions as 'recognized patterns of 
behavior or practice around which expectations 
converge' allows the concept to cover almost 
every regularized pattern of activity between 
states, ... thus rendering it largely 
meaningless. 97 
Institutions, defined in the above manner, could be used 
to describe any number of activities between states. For 
theorists wishing to explain a specific behavior of 
states, it is important to limit conceptual definitions. 
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Consider, for example, the prolific analyses of the 
stratospheric ozone issue. 98 Much of the work on this 
issue has established that without institutional 
structures (including UNEP, the scientific community, and 
non-governmental organizations) cooperative agreements to 
protect the ozone layer would not have been possible. 99 
Because institutions are defined so broadly, they can 
include Peter Haas's epistemic community,1°° Karen Litfin' s 
diplomatic norms and practices, 101 Parson's scientific 
organizations (both national and international), 1°2 and 
Philippe Sands' s legal rules. 103 By incorporating all 
these principles, the institutional thesis is able to 
account for cooperation. However, it remains extremely 
difficult to understand the institutional explanation. 
All of these theorists seek to demonstrate that 
sufficient self-interest1°4 and power relationships105 alone 
could not account for cooperation. What all of these 
authors seem to disregard is the extent to which the CFC 
issue constituted a serious threat to the general well-
being of large populations. Neorealists argue that issues 
with the potential to reduce state capability directly 
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involve self-interest motivations. Why has cooperation 
developed on solving ozone depletion? For neorealists, 
cooperation developed because of sufficient self-interest 
and progressed via institutional norms. 
Without a theoretical discussion that properly 
defines the institution, neoliberal works make giant 
intellectual leaps. The role of the institution in 
explaining cooperation appears to encompass the majority 
of the relations between states. Theory, for the 
international relations scholar, quickly becomes an 
historical description of international environmental 
ventures. No longer does the theoretical endeavor purport 
to explain or understand specific phenomena. 
The position taken in this project is that a 
structural explanation of international environmental 
cooperation must precede an institutional description. 
Without such a notion, institutional analyses remain fuzzy 
and limited in their ability to explain or describe. It 
is important to understand that inclusion of institutional 
processes does not undermine the use of neorealism. 
Rather, a rich explanation of environmental cooperation is 
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established by combining structural explanations with 
institutional descriptions. 
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NEOREALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 
Increasingly, as theorists attempt to understand 
international politics in the post-Cold War1 system, 
explaining cooperation becomes a litmus test for a 
successful theory. 2 Neorealism, with its emphasis on 
power politics, the primacy of the state, and anarchy is 
considered unable to account for cooperation generally, 
and environmental cooperation specifically. 3 If this is 
true, it is indeed a problem. Cooperation, in the form of 
international legal agreements, is a regular occurrence in 
international relations. More than 130 multilateral 
environmental treaties have been signed in this century, 
over half since 1974. 4 The increasing salience of 
environmental issues necessitates that neorealism provide 
some explanation concerning the behavior of states on this 
matter. 
Applying the neorealist paradigm to a low-politics 
issue, 5 such as environmental cooperation, becomes a 
troublesome task. Writing during the Cold War, Kenneth 
52 
Waltz was concerned with military and security issues. 
His theory emphasizes gee-political strategies and the 
dynamics of polarity. 6 Cooperation, for Waltz, is 
considered an anomalous occurrence in international 
politics. 7 His theoretical framework suggests that 
competition, rather than cooperation, results from an 
anarchic global environment. 8 · Only passing mention is 
made of the need to seek global cooperation on 
environmental matters. In the final paragraph, of the 
concluding chapter of TIP, Waltz notes that, "Global 
problems can be solved by no nation singly, only by a 
number of nations working together." 9 This is a valid 
statement, and welcome news for scholars wishing to employ 
his theory to explain environmental cooperation. However, 
since the dominating logic, up to that point, revolved 
around the enduring tendency toward competition, theorists 
are left wondering how global cooperation is possible. 
The door to understanding environmental cooperation is 
left closed; but at least there is a door! 
In order to open the door, and explain environmental 
cooperation, it is first necessary to find the correct 
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keys. A neorealist paradigm incapable of allowing for 
cooperation in international politics will be useless in 
the present endeavor. Therefore, the paradigm will be 
examined for "keys" or opportunities that assist in 
providing an explanation of cooperation. A careful 
analysis of the paradigm will suggest that cooperation can 
indeed develop in an anarchic system. 
To understand the traditional neorealist's disregard 
for cooperation, it is first important to understand their 
preoccupation with competition and conflict. Kenneth 
Waltz employs the analogy of an oligopic market to outline 
his structural dimension of international politics. 
According to the oligopic theory of economics, firms are 
in a self-help, laissez-faire system. 10 Their primary 
goal is to survive. 11 If they do not, they face 
bankruptcy. Competition and rivalry dominate the behavior 
of firms as they desperately seek to maintain their 
market-share. 12 The competitive self-help system is 
created by the co-action of these firms and perpetuates as 
firms have no choice but to compete to survive. 
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Waltz transposes this "structure" on to the 
international scene. States replace firms as the dominant 
uniti3 and international anarchy replaces the laissez-
faire market as the ordering principle.i4 The 
consequences for states in anarchy remain the same. The 
states' number one priority is to survive.is Like the 
oligopic market, they must rely only on themselves to 
ensure their survival. They, too, exist in a self-help 
system. Because of this, states use power as a means to 
ensure their survival.i6 Power can be measured by looking 
at a state's capabilities. For Waltz, capabilities are 
measured by considering 
all of the following items: size of population 
and territory, resource endowment, economic 
capability, military strength, political 
stability and competence. i7 
Again, thinking analogically, states (like firms) 
compete in the international system. There is an 
uneasiness to join cooperative ventures. Doing so would 
increase efficiency but lead to interdependence. States 
become vulnerable if they specialize.is Therefore, the 
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system tends towards like states with varying 
capabilities. 
For the neorealist, the behavior of states is 
predictable. Competition trumps cooperation as states 
seek desperately to survive in an anarchic "self-help" 
system. Robert Gilpin states flatly that the first 
assumption underlying all realist thought is "the 
essentially conflictual nature of international affairs ... 
Anarchy is the rule; order, justice, and morality are the 
exceptions." 19 Joseph Grieco contends that "realists 
argue that states are preoccupied with their security and 
power; by consequence, states are predisposed toward 
conflict and competition." 20 He also considers that, 
"international anarchy fosters competition and conflict 
among states and inhibits their willingness to cooperate 
even when they share common interests. " 21 Kenneth Waltz 
agrees with this assessment of anarchy. He suggests that 
A state worries about a division of possible 
gains that may favor others more than itself. 
That is the first way in which the structure of 
international politics limits the cooperation of 
states. A state also worries lest it become 
dependent on others through cooperative 
endeavors and exchanges of goods and services. 
That is the second way in which the structure of 
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international politics limits the cooperation of 
states. 22 
The stage is thus set. The anarchical international 
system is governed by rules of competition and conflict. 
As states seek desperately to survive, they ignore 
cooperative strategies and rely solely on competition. 
For these theorists, anarchy inhibits cooperation. 
This rather dogmatic view of the international 
structure tends to incite fierce criticism. 23 Placing 
heavy reliance on an abstract structural component, and 
providing that component with the ability to dictate the 
outcome of state behavior, appears to be deterministic. 24 
The conflictual nature of international affairs is 
predetermined by the structure of the system a priori the 
activities of states. 
This is a debilitating charge. First, it renders 
this form of neorealism useless as an explanatory theory. 
There would be no need to investigate the behavior of 
states since the theory already mandates conflict. 
Cooperation would have to be viewed as an anomalous 
occurrence in international relations. That it is 
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present, and proliferates in the system, would be 
disregarded. 
Second, the charge of determinism is difficult to 
defend at a philosophical level. 25 Since the individual 
is not prescribed any agency, the course of history is set 
and the encounters of states, merely the works of destiny. 
The claims of structuralism are uncomfortable, especially 
for the theorist who considers free-will a component of 
the self . 26 Pragmatically, the claims of structuralism 
are highly confining and uninteresting. It becomes futile 
to study the components necessary for robust cooperation. 
It is also illogical to contemplate the possibilities of 
change in the international system. 
This strict neorealist theory, based on the oligopic 
analogy of the competitive market, appears incapable of 
accounting for cooperation. Further, it seems to stymie 
additional philosophical inquiry. Does this extinguish 
all hope of providing a structural explanation of 
environmental cooperation? Not necessarily. The last two 
decades in the discipline of international relations have 
been witness to a host of modified neorealist writings. 21 
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Waltz's theory acted as a snowball placed atop a steep 
hill. As it slowly rolled down, it continued to pick up 
more and more snow. Coming to rest at the bottom of the 
hill, it appeared significantly larger. TIP, the theory, 
can be considered the original snowball. The excess snow 
represents the neorealist paradigm, or world view, that 
dominates the discipline today. 
In this manner, the strict neorealist theory 
developed by Waltz may be seen as "deeply and perhaps 
fatally flawed." 28 However, the greater neorealist 
paradigm may "continue to inform the community of 
international relations scholars." 29 It is from this 
greater paradigm that the keys can be found to unlock the 
"cooperation door." 
Recent neorealist writings rely less on the oligopic 
analogy of competition and more on the logic of self-
help. 30 In so doing, these moderate neorealists make no 
claim about a competitive preference. Indeed, Charles 
Glaser contends that, "self-help tells us essentially 
nothing about whether states should pref er cooperation 
over competition. " 31 Self-help means just that, a state, 
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in order to ensure its survival, must look out for its own 
security interests. Cooperation is an important form of 
self-help. 32 
Remaining true to the neorealist understanding of 
state preferences, survival remains the states' number one 
priority. However, cooperation can now be viewed as a 
means to ensuring that survival. This is an important key 
to a neorealist understanding of cooperation. The state 
is provided a measure of agency and may choose between 
competitive and cooperative strategies. 33 Note how Arthur 
Stein outlines the options for states, 
Outcomes of international cooperation and 
conflict emerge as a result of states' strategic 
choices, which include both cooperation and 
conflict as strategies. Nations are neither 
inveterate cooperators nor defectors. Both 
options constitute parts of states' repertoires 
of behavior, and countries use both to ensure 
survival and fulfill national interests. 34 
Less reliance on the oligopic analogy and increased 
emphasis on the logic of self-help removes charges of 
determinism from the theoretical framework. A "menu for 
choice" 35 is now granted the primary actor in 
international affairs. It is possible to consider that 
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where competition may be used to avoid losses in 
capabilities, cooperation may be used in the same 
fashion. 36 Charles Glaser contends that 
although it is correct in stating that 
uncertainty about the adversary's motives 
creates reasons for a state to compete, the 
standard argument fails to recognize that 
uncertainty about motives also creates powerful 
reasons for states to cooperate. 37 
A brief review of recent literature concerning 
"cooperation under anarchy" 38 suggests that cooperation is 
a successful state strategy. Game theoretic models 
consistently demonstrate two important points for the 
present discussion. First, the models support the notion 
that cooperation under anarchy is indeed possible. 39 
Second, the robust nature of cooperation witnessed in 
these models, reinforces the benefit claims of moderate 
neorealist theorists. Cooperative strategies invariably 
win out over competitive strategies. 40 
It should be added that although the paradigm grants 
states the option to choose cooperation, they are not 
given carte blanche with regard to the matter. The 
overriding logic of self-help and the security dilemma 
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requires that states consider the ramifications of their 
cooperative ventures. States, like Waltz suggests, will 
be wary of cooperative schemes that expose their 
capabilities to harm. 41 Enforcement and monitoring 
mechanisms remain under the sovereign control of states. 
Indeed the highly constraining logic of self-help appears 
to be followed religiously by states. Elliot Richardson 
notes that, 
none of the existing environmental agreements 
confers on an international institution the 
power to set binding standards, issue and 
enforce regulations, or prescribe sanctions. 42 
The logic of self-help suggests that cooperation, 
although present and possible in the international system, 
does not lead to the diminution of state sovereignty. 
States still seek to maintain and enhance capabilities, 
limited cooperation is just another means to that end. 
This moderate reading of structure not only allows 
for cooperation, it makes it a viable, important strategy 
for ensuring the security of the state. Strict 
neorealists will most likely be perturbed by such a 
modification. The highly touted parsimony of Waltz's 
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structural definition43 becomes clouded with state 
preference calculations and a cooperation factor. 
However, it seems warranted to surrender some parsimony 
for more explanatory power. 44 
This modified view of anarchy suggests that 
cooperation can be accounted for by neorealism. Moving 
away from the blatant and disturbing nuances of 
structuralism to a more balanced concern for the 
ramifications and consequences of states under anarchy, 
the broader neorealist paradigm survives the "cooperation" 
test. The door now appears open, and a structural 
explanation of environmental cooperation can be outlined. 
Three principles, present in the neorealist paradigm, 
are necessary fixtures in a structural explanation of 
environmental cooperation. Without these three 
components, it is unlikely that cooperation will be 
achieved. First, the state must be considered the primary 
international actor. Second, the cooperative venture must 
"mirror" the power distribution in the international 
system. If the system contains a hegemon, its support is 
necessary in order to produce substantial cooperation. 
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Third, since the maintenance of capabilities is a 
dominating concern, the benefits of cooperation must 
outweigh the costs. If these three principles are met, 
the likelihood of generating cooperation on the issue is 
dramatically increased. 
I. The Primacy of the State 
The primacy of the state is a central tenet of all 
realist thought. 45 This special status given to states is 
due in part to their claims of territorial sovereignty. 
Sovereignty entails that a state has the power to decide 
its own course of action, no matter how much it is 
constrained by the system. Waltz summarizes the 
sovereignty concept nicely, 
States develop their own strategies, chart their 
own courses, make their own decisions about how 
to meet whatever needs they experience and 
whatever desires they develop. It is no more 
contradictory to say that sovereign states are 
always constrained and often tightly so than it 
is to say that free individuals often make 
decisions under the heavy pressure of events. 46 
Constraints on a state may hinder its ability to do 
much of what it wishes to do. To claim that states are 
sovereign does not enjoin them with the power to do as 
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they please. States, as Waltz notes, "may be hardpressed 
all around, constrained to act in ways they would like to 
avoid, and able to do hardly anything just as they would 
like to. " 47 
The primacy of the state is important in another 
respect. For the neorealist, the state is viewed as a 
"unitary rational actor." Instead of "opening" the 
apparatus of the state, it remains closed. 48 Because of 
this, neorealists miss the nuances of the state. Pressure 
groups, political infighting, and the opinions of the 
citizenry, are assumed away. However, because of the 
underlying assumption in neorealist theory that states 
seek to survive, state attributes are considered 
unnecessary components. 49 No matter the ideological, 
social, and political struggles that take place within the 
state, the conditioning effect of anarchy requires that a 
state choose the most rational course of action- the 
course that best maintains or enhances its capabilities. 
The component of state primacy has a distinct effect 
on the theoretical emphasis. Although the state is by far 
the most dominant actor in international relations, it is 
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by no means the only actor. Non-state actors, including 
international governmental and non-governmental 
organizations, are given a "license to operate" in the 
international system by states. Unlike the neoliberal 
model of cooperation, the institution plays a minimal role 
in the activities of states. 
Institutions provide information, enhance the 
negotiating environment, and coordinate scientific 
studies. 50 These activities do not compromise a state's 
capabilities and do not require the state to specialize. 
Institutions are sometimes necessary but never sufficient 
entities for gaining cooperation on an issue. States are 
motivated by self-interest and the need for security. 
That they use institutions to meet their security needs, 
does not mandate an activist institutional role. 51 
It should also be noted that an institutional history 
of success on one issue does not entail success on several 
more. Many institutionalists seek to demonstrate that 
certain institutional approaches to cooperation will 
succeed in overcoming the inhibitions of states. 52 
However, for neorealists, the dominating logic of the 
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security dilemma suggests that the drive to maintain 
capabilities will trump innovative institutional 
approaches unless there is another reason to cooperate. A 
classic example of this difference is the current 
employment of the "convention-protocol" approach. 53 This 
approach was first developed by UNEP as a mechanism to 
facilitate measures to protect the Mediterranean Sea from 
a host of pollutants. 54 The first step in the approach is 
the creation of an "umbrella convention" which simply 
includes a "definition of terms, a description of the 
geographic scope of the agreement, a general commitment to 
co-operate, and an outline of the work that needs to be 
done at future meetings." 55 Subsequent "protocols" are 
then created to address, "specific sources of pollution 
and set forth plans for remedial action." 56 
Officials from UNEP considered this mechanism 
successful at getting states to cooperate. Therefore, in 
UNEP-coordinated negotiations after the MEDPlan, they 
attempted to apply the same technique. 57 This appeared to 
work in the case of ozone protection. However, attempts 
at achieving cooperation on climate change and other 
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regional seas initiatives were complicated and 
ineffective. 58 In neorealist terms, it is not the 
institutional approach that warrants study; but rather the 
issue itself and how states perceive the potential 
problem. If indeed the problem necessitates a solution, 
the institutional approach provides a description of how 
the cooperation is formalized. 
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II. Power Distribution and the Presence of Hegemony 
Kenneth Waltz considers the "distribution of 
capabilities" among the states in the system to be an 
important component to his structural theory. 59 The 
structural explanation of environmental cooperation, 
developed here, maintains this theme. Agreements to 
manage the global ecosystem must be developed with the 
"distribution of power" factor in mind. 6° Further, if the 
system contains a hegemon, successful cooperation will 
require its acquiesence or active support. 
A common assumption that leads the environmental 
discussion forward is the belief that increased human 
activity and the resulting "transformations of the 
environment" 61 are global problems that require global 
solutions. As Waltz argues, global problems cannot be 
solved by individual states. 62 The requirement that large 
numbers of sovereign states must cooperate to solve 
problems at the global level can be debilitating. States 
often have different formulas for achieving their security 
needs. A good example of this is provided by studying the 
interplay between economics and the environment. 
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It has been known for some time that environmental 
issues and economic development are intrinsically tied to 
each other. The Brundtland Commission, articulates this 
notion, 
It is impossible to separate economic 
development issues from environmental issues; 
many forms of development erode the 
environmental resources upon which they must be 
based, and environmental degradation can 
undermine economic development. 63 
Because of the inability to separate economic 
development from environmental issues, a range of complex 
problems arise. There is a tension created between the 
North and the South. The North is considered the 
developed industrial economies of North America, Europe, 
and the Pacific Rim. 64 These nations rapidly expanded 
their economies throughout the last half of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. Now in a position to slow their 
economic growth, many of these countries are interested in 
protecting the global environment. The South, or 
developing states of Latin America, Africa, and Asia, 65 
consider that it is now their turn to increase industrial 
output and raise their standards of living. Because of 
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this, many international environmental issues split the 
states into two camps, the North and the South. 
Often, the high costs involved in reversing 
environmental degradation or ensuring it does not take 
place strains the North/South relationship. When this 
situation arises, many weak states are unable to comply 
with the provisions in cooperative agreements. Because of 
limited capabilities, these states simply do not have the 
power to cooperate. Other states may be dissuaded from 
cooperating after rationally weighing the consequences of 
cooperation. 66 Both types of states require hegemonic 
influence if substantial cooperation is to be achieved. 
Consider how Waltz characterizes the position of the 
United States in the international system, 
Economically the United States is far and away 
the leading power. If the leading power does 
not lead, the others cannot follow. All nations 
may be in the same leaky world boat, but one of 
them wields the biggest dipper. In economic and 
social affairs, as in military matters, other 
countries are inclined to leave much of the 
bailing to us. 67 
Although recent claims have been made concerning the 
decline of U.S. hegemony, 68 few will disagree with Waltz's 
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characterization. Especially with regard to environmental 
matters, which may necessitate scientific knowledge, 
technology transfers, and aid packages, 69 the position of 
the United States is crucial. The U.S. may be called upon 
frequently to "bail" on behalf of the South. Similarly, 
the refusal to support a cooperative venture (even 
tacitly) can have a deleterious effect on the outcome. 
If a hegemon decides to support a cooperative scheme, 
it may use its extensive capabilities to persuade other 
states of the merits of joining in two ways. First, 
through benign incentives, hegemons can provide financial 
"carrots" to states unable or initially unwilling to join 
cooperative ventures. Examples of this type of incentive 
are technology transfers, development loans, and temporal 
extensions for compliance. 
Second, hegemons can wield a negative power and 
coerce cooperation. Coercing compliance is feasible for a 
hegemon because of its extensive resource and economic 
capabilities. Coercion will usually take the form of 
unilateral actions and sanctions. The use of tariffs and 
the creation of new technologies which outdate previous 
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technologies can be considered coercive examples of 
hegemonic power. The neorealist also leaves open the "use 
of force" option to ensure compliance. 
III. Interest and the Cost/Benefit Analysis 
There has been an implicit understanding in the 
discussion above that a state can successfully weigh the 
costs of cooperating. It is now time to examine how a 
state can indeed do just that. The final neorealist 
component necessary for the generation of cooperation is 
the "benefit" component. Accordingly, a state must 
perceive it to be in its best interest to cooperate or not 
cooperate on an issue. Waltzian neorealism does not seem 
to have a need for state preference calculations. 70 
Instead, this strict neorealist theory suggests that the 
structural constraints weigh so heavily on the state, that 
the preferred state response is self-evident. 71 Moving 
away from this version of neorealism, and allowing the 
state more freedom to choose policy responses, creates a 
need to explicate how the state is capable of choosing a 
rational policy response. 
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To begin, with regard to environmental matters, 
states must perceive that a problem exists. The 
perception of a problem sounds like an obvious and rather 
uninteresting concept. However, perception of harm is 
crucial if cooperation is to be engendered. An example 
may help illustrate this matter. In the early 1970s, it 
was technologically infeasible to mine rare earth 
minerals, known as manganese nodules, from the ocean 
floor. Because of this, states did not perceive of a 
problem with regard to nodule exhaustibility. 12 However, 
as some states gained the capabilities of mining these 
minerals, states began to perceive that there was an 
exhaustibility problem. 73 It was this perception on the 
part of states that created the environmental crisis. 
Once a problem is perceived by the state, it has two 
policy options. First, it can cooperate with other states 
and attempt to alleviate the problem. Second, it can 
ignore the concerns of other states and maintain its 
current activities. How does a state decide which course 
to take? 
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Because a state is considered a rational unitary 
actor, the interest of the state is judged by how a 
problem affects state capabilities. As has been 
demonstrated above, states exist in a self-help system and 
consider survival their number one concern. As they seek 
to survive, states are cognizant of the need to maintain 
and enhance capabilities. 
In order to judge which action to take on a 
particular environmental issue, states must perform a 
"cost/benefit" analysis. Using the information that they 
have obtained concerning the matter in question, 74 states 
weigh the costs of cooperating against the benefits. 
Particular emphasis is placed on the certainty of the 
problem and how that problem could reduce state 
capabilities. 
Consider how a cost/benefit analysis may reduce the 
likelihood of a weak state cooperating on a global 
problem. When the costs are deemed to be so high that the 
economic capabilities of weak states are severely 
compromised, it makes little sense to cooperate. 
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Maintenance of capabilities overrides the desire to 
cooperate to protect the global environment. 
The powerful actors in the system are in a similar 
situation. However, the question for these states is not 
whether cooperation is possible. The question that these 
states must ask, is how much are we willing to finance 
weaker state compliance? As it has already been shown, 
the hegemon may be needed to finance the cooperation of 
weak states. Powerful states must consider how serious 
the environmental threat is to the maintenance of their 
own capabilities. If it is demonstrated that serious harm 
may befall all states in the system, the hegemon, and 
other powerful states, will consider the benefits of aid 
to outweigh the costs. 
The discussion above has established that the 
neorealist paradigm is capable of explaining cooperation 
in an anarchical system. Further, three components to 
understanding environmental cooperation from a neorealist 
standpoint were outlined. It is important to consider 
that the state is the primary actor in international 
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relations. Continuing the neorealist emphasis on power, 
it is considered necessary to involve the hegemon in a 
cooperative agreement. Finally, states must perceive of 
the environmental concern and consider it in their best 
interest to cooperate to solve it. With the support of 
these theoretical tools, it becomes possible to study a 
number of international environmental agreements. 
77 
NOTES 
1 The Cold War is generally considered over, it began 
shortly after the end of World War II and wound down in 
the late 1980s, see John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: 
Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International 
Security 15 (1990): 5-56. 
Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics 
Revisited," in Charles W. Kegley, ed., Controversies in 
International Relations Theory; Realism and Neoliberal 
Challenge (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985): 83. 
Ibid., Robert 0. Keohane, ed. Neorealism and Its 
Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); for 
commentary on this point see, Charles Glaser, "Realists as 
Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International 
Security 19 (Winter 1994/95) : 50-90. 
Peter M. Haas and Jan Sundgren, "Evolving International 
Environmental Law: Changing Practices of National 
Sovereignty," in Nazli Choucri, ed., Global Accord 
(Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, 1993): 405. 
5 High politics issues are generally considered peace and 
security issues. Low politics issues are social and 
economic in nature. See Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene 
R. Wittkopf, World Politics: Trends and Transformations, 
second edition (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985): 9 and 
passim. 
6 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New 
York: Random House, 1979): 79-210. 
7 Ibid. I pp. 105-7. 
Ibid. I p. 77. 
Ibid. I p. 210. 
10 Ibid. I p. 105. 
78 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. I p. 93. 
14 Ibid. I p. 88. 
15 Ibid. I p. 91. 
16 Ibid. I p. 98. 
17 Ibid. I p. 131. 
18 Ibid. I p. 105. 
19 Robert Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of 
Political Realism," in Robert 0. Keohane, ed., Neorealism 
and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1986) : 304. 
20 J h G . C ' ' osep M. r1eco,ooperat1on Affiong Nations: Europe. 
America and Non-tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca,N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 1990): 4. This is also quoted 
in Glaser, p. 57. 
21 Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Li mi ts of 
Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the New Liberal 
Institutionalism," in Charles W. Kegley, ed., 
Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism 
and Neoliberal Challenge (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1995): 151. 
22 Waltz, p. 106. 
23 Robert Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: 
Beyond International Relations Theory," in Robert 0. 
Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1986): 204-254; Richard K. 
Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," in Robert 0. Keohane, 
ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1986): 255-300; Alexander Wendt, 
"Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social 
79 
Construction of Power Politics," International 
Organization 46 (1992): 391-425; for commentary on this 
debate see Stephen Haggard, "Structuralism and its 
Critics: Recent Progress in International Relations 
Theory," in Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford, eds., 
Progress in Postwar International Relations (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1991): 403-37. 
24 Martin Hollis and Steve Smith suggest that this may be 
either a strict or situational determinism. See, Martin 
Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding 
International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1990): 114-5. 
25 Ibid. 
26 For a discussion of free-will, see Richard Lindley, 
Autonomy (Atlantic Highlands,NJ: Humanities Press 
International, Inc., 1986): 63-70. 
27 Glaser, "Realists as Optimists;" William C. Wohlfarth, 
"Realism and the End of the Cold War," International 
Security 19 (Winter 1994-5): 91-129; Robert Gilpin, .'Ihe. 
Political Economy of International Relations 
(Princeton,NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987). 
28 Ethan B. Kapstein, "Is Realism Dead? The Domestic 
Sources of International Politics," International 
Organization 49 (Autumn 1995): 751. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Glaser, "Realists as Optimists." 
31 Ibid., p. 59. 
32 Ibid. I p. 53. 
33 Ibid. I p. 58. 
80 
34 Arthur Stein, Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and 
Choice in International Relations (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1990): 173. 
35 This term is taken from Bruce Russett and Harvey 
Starr, World Politics: The Menu for Choice (New York: W.H. 
Freeman and Company, 1992). For insight into their use of 
the menu for choice and how it coheres with the discussion 
involving Arthur Stein and Charles Glaser, see pages 20-
25. 
36 Glaser, p. 59. 
37 Ibid., p. 59. 
38 This is the title of Kenneth Oye, ed., Cooperation 
Under Anarchy (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1986). I am using it here in a more general sense to 
refer to a variety of game-theortic works that appeared 
after TIP. 
39 This best example of this is the TIT-FOR-TAT strategy 
exemplified in Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of 
Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984). 
40 This has been demonstrated in a number of works, see 
Kenneth Oye, Coo~eration Under bnarchy; Duncan Snidal, 
"The Game Theory of International Politics," in Kenneth 
Oye, ed., Cooperation Under bnarchy (Princeton,NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1986): 25; Robert Keohane, 
"Reciprocity in International Relations," International 
Organization 40 (1986): 1-27. Further some theorists 
contend that even though cooperation under anarchy 
proliferates, it does not reflect the relative gains 
concerns of states in the international system (see 
Richard M. Grieco, "Realist Theory and the Problem of 
International Coperation: Analysis with an Amended 
Prisoner's Dilemma Model," The Journal of Politics 50 
(1988): 600-624.) However, recent analysis suggests that 
even when relative gains situations develop, cooperation 
still proliferates (see, Marc L. Busch and Eric R. 
Reinhardt, "Nice Strategies in a World of Relative Gains," 
81 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 37 (September 1993): 427-
445.) 
41 Waltz, p. 107. 
42 Elliot Richardson, "Climate Change: Problems of Law-
Making," in Andrew Hurrell and Richard Kingsbury, eds., 
The International Politics of the Environment (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1992): 168. 
43 Haggard, p. 417. 
44 Ibid. I p. 418. 
45 Gilpin, p. 305. 
46 Waltz, p. 96. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., p. 97-98; and for commentary see Hollis and 
Smith, generally. 
49 Ibid., p. 70; A good discussion of this issue in 
neorealism is developed by Robert Powell, "Anarchy in 
International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal 
Debate," International Organization 48 (Spring 1994): 313-
344. He states, in a discussion surrounding Robert Cox's 
notion of neorealism as a problem-solving theory, "The 
former [neorealism] uses the ceteris paribus assumption to 
restrict the statement of a specific problem 'to a limited 
number of variables which are amenable to a relatively 
close and precise examination.' Among the many things 
that problem-solving theories may exclude by taking them 
as given and unproblematic are intersubjective 
understandings and expectations. The ceteris paribus 
assumption effectively freezes and thereby assumes away 
interaction of units and structure. 
It seems entirely appropriate to assume away this 
interaction in a problem-solving theory as long as the 
applicability or domain of the theory is understood to be 
82 
bounded by the ceteris paribus assumption." Ibid., p. 
322. 
50 Glaser, p. 84. 
51 Ibid., pp. 83-85. 
52 Keohane, "Reciprocity," pp. 19-26. 
53 For a discussion of the convention/protocol approach, 
see Lawrence Susskind and Connie Ozawa, "Negotiating More 
Effective International Environmental Agreements," in 
Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury, eds.,~ 
International Politics of the Environment (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992); 144-149. 
54 Ibid. I p. 145. 
55 Ibid., p. 144. 
56 Ibid., p. 145. 
57 Ibid. , p. 14 5; and Daniel Bodansky, "The United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A 
Commentary," in Philippe Sands, ed., Greening 
International Law (New York: The New Press, 1994): 210 
58 For commentary on the symbolic nature of climate 
change see, Daniel Bodansky, "The United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change," p. 210; and for the 
symbolic nature of regional seas programmes sea, Tony 
Brenton, The Greening of Machiavelli (London: Earthscan 
Publications, 1994): 96. 
59 Waltz, pp. 97-99. 
6° For a discussion of this notion, see Gary L. Scott and 
Craig L. Carr, "Multilateral Treaties and the Formation of 
Customary International Law," paper presented at the 
International Studies Association 37th Annual Convention, 
San Diego, California, April 18, 1996. Their discussion 
of multilateral treaties needing the participation of 
83 
pertinent states (termed sine qua non states) appears 
apropos to the present matter. 
61 Ken Conca, Michael Alberty, and Geoffrey D. Dabelko, 
eds., Green Planet Blues: Environmental Politics from 
Stockholm to Rio (Boulder, CO: Westview Publishing, 1995): 
3 . 
62 Waltz, p. 210. 
63 As quoted in, Steven Shrybman, "Trading Away the 
Environment," World Policy Journal (Winter 1991-2): 94. 
64 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981): 144. 
65 Ibid. 
66 How this happens, will be discussed below in the 
section entitled, "Interest and the Cost/Benefit 
Analysis." 
67 Waltz, p. 210. 
68 Robert 0. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and 
Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton,NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1984). 
69 For a discussion of these matters, see Edward A. 
Parson, "Protecting the Ozone Layer," in Peter Haas, 
Robert Keohane, and Marc Levy, eds., Institutions for the 
Earth (Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, 1993): 27-74. 
70 Waltz, pp. 107-111. 
71 Ibid. 
72 W. Frank Newton, "Inexhaustibility as a Law of the Sea 
Determinant," Texas Journal of International Law 16 
(1981) :422. 
73 Ibid. 
84 
74 I think it should be emphasized that states will never 
a full understanding of an environmental issue, nor 
they be able to obtain all information available on 
have 
will 
an environmental issue. 
85 
THE U.N. LAW OF THE SEA III: POWER MANIFESTED IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL ARENA 
On November 16, 1994, a process begun over twenty 
years before culminated in the Third United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea1 entering into force. 2 
Nations from around the world celebrated the long and 
arduous journey to the party in Jamaica. The convention 
was heralded as a new global constitution for the oceans. 3 
It is a comprehensive and exhausting list of rules, 
regulations, and promises by the states of the world to 
manage the ocean resources. The majority of the text 
covers issues such as navigation, territorial sea limits, 
contiguous zones, overflight matters, resource management 
and dispute settlement mechanisms. 4 The text encompasses 
200 single-spaced pages, divided into seventeen parts with 
320 articles and 448 provisions. 5 
While the agreement suggests that world states can 
agree to a comprehensive and lengthy set of rules to 
manage the oceans, it also suggests that power, self-
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interest, the maintenance of capabilities, and the logic 
of self-help, continue to be important and dominating 
factors in international affairs. This study examines the 
political struggle over just one part of UNCLOS III. Part 
XI provides insight into how U.S. hegemony radically 
altered an innovative international regime to manage deep 
seabed minerals. 6 
The historical march to Jamaica in 1994 begins almost 
three decades earlier. As the maritime technological 
capabilities of states began to increase throughout the 
1950s and 1960s, state became acutely aware of the need to 
regulate certain activities. 7 Among these activities, is 
the mining of manganese nodules. These nodules contain 
nickel, copper, cobalt, and manganese, 8 and can 
potentially accent a state's economic capabilities. The 
problem for states is that these mineral deposits lie on 
the deep seabed. This area did not need to be regulated 
until the capabilities of states made the mining possible. 
Because there were no laws to regulate state activity 
on the deep seabed, states in the system were in need of a 
comprehensive regime. Two options presented themselves. 
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The United States, and a number of other western 
industrialized countries, felt that the deep seabed should 
remain, as it had historically, res nullius, or the 
property of nobody. 9 Such a ruling would favor "laissez-
faire, free-trade principles" 10 and allow those states 
with the capabilities to mine to reap the profits. 
Less developed countries (LDCs) promoted the idea 
that the deep seabed and high seas should be considered 
res communis, of the common property of all . 11 This 
notion became the predominant viewpoint of a majority of 
LDCs, and is best exemplified in Arvid Pardo's speech 
before the U.N. General Assembly in 1967 espousing the 
view that the deep seabed is "the common heritage of 
mankind. 1112 
It did not take long before the LDC majority in the 
United Nations adopted the "Moratorium Resolution, " 13 
dictating that states should refrain from exploiting the 
deep seabed until international legal mechanisms were in 
place. The LDC majority in the United Nations was 
beginning to make its presence known. Using the one-
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state, one-vote mechanism, it appeared that "on paper" at 
least, the notion of res communis was becoming the norm. 
With this divisive situation unresolved, the first 
session of the Third Law of the Sea Conference "was 
gavelled to order in Caracas in 1974."u The North/South 
split over the deep seabed issue appeared insurmountable. 
As two legal scholars would contend, 
The distinction between res communis and res 
nullius as applied to the deep seabed proved to 
be irreconcilable at UNCLOS III. While 
developed states espoused laissez-faire, free-
trade principles, Third World states denounced 
the fact that in the modern era, 'open access 
meant equal access to the valuable resources of 
the commons in name only.' The philosophical 
lines had been drawn for a protracted 
ideological confrontation. 15 
Indeed, the ideological confrontation took on added 
weight when only three months after the first Caracas 
session closed, the U.S. based Deepsea Ventures Inc. 
claimed "exclusive mining rights" to 60,000 square 
kilometers of the Pacific Ocean. 16 
Throughout eleven heated sessions, 17 the debate 
concerning the deep seabed would continue. Finally, in 
December of 1982, an overwhelming majority of U.N. member 
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states adopted the Convention. Because of a "no 
reservations" rule agreed to early in the negotiations, 18 
states that ratified the document were committed to all 
parts. This included Part XI, the rules and regulations 
to govern deep seabed mining. 
Again, because of the sovereign equality rule19 in 
many U.N. conferences, the LDCs brokered a highly 
idealistic document that ensured revenue-sharing and 
technology transfers. Titled "the Area, 1120 Part XI 
embodies the notion of res communis. Articles 136 and 137 
proclaim the Area "the common heritage of mankind" and 
deny states exclusive sovereignty. 21 Additionally, a 
governing body, the International Sea-Bed Authority, is 
charged with the sole responsibility of conducting 
research22 and defining mining policies. 23 Part XI also 
mandates technology transfers to LDCs24 and establishes an 
international mining company, "the Enterprise" to handle 
all mining activities. 25 Finally, all administrative 
functions mandate one-state, one-vote tactics which 
strongly enhance LDC administrative influence.
26 
90 
The response by the United States and several other 
maritime powers was less than exuberant. Many statesmen 
and scholars alike considered that 
while 117 states became signatories to the new 
1982 Convention on that December day, many other 
governments continued to harbor real frustration 
and dissatisfaction with the final legal 
product. Included among these disgruntled 
governments were several of the most important 
international maritime actors, including the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Italy and the 
Federal Republic of Germany. 27 
In the years following Jamaica, a series of 
belligerent acts would be carried out by these powerful 
states, in defiance of the U.N. Convention. 
A number of these acts included the creation of 
"mini-treaties" 28 to deal with many of the same concerns 
dealt with in UNCLOS III. Just prior to the 10 December 
1982 signing ceremony, four major maritime powers signed 
the Agreement Concerning Interim Arrangements Relating to 
Polymetallic Nodules of the Deep Sea Bed. 29 Two years 
later, in Geneva, the U.S., Belgium, the U.K., West 
Germany, France, Italy, Japan, and the Netherlands, signed 
an agreement to "prevent disputes over sites among 
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companies mining minerals from the sea-bed outside 
territorial waters. 1130 
Calls for more drastic measures were sounded. 
According to some, 
considering the number and, in many instances, 
the technological development, of the non-
signatories to the 1982 UN Convention, it might 
be to their advantage at some future time to be 
parties to a separate and comprehensive sea law 
treaty. 31 
These actions and policy discussions had an enduring 
affect on the Convention and the Parties to it. The LDCs, 
victors on paper, were on the verge of losing all that 
they had gained. Early in 1972, Harold Brown noted that 
the consequences of non-agreement will be 
catastrophic only for those who have entertained 
expectations quite out of keeping with present 
trends in international relations. 32 
It appeared that this early warning would prove true. 
The number of states acceding to UNCLOS III was bringing 
the treaty ever closer to an "in force" date. 33 After 
such a date, non-parties would be legally free to engage 
in deep seabed mining because of the pacta tertiis 
principle in international law. 
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With time running out for the LDCs, the Secretary-
General of the United Nations initiated informal 
consultations34 in order to resolve the Part XI dilemma. 
By bending to the demands of maritime powers, a 
breakthrough agreement was soon annexed to the treaty. 35 
The adjoining 'Agreement' 36 was adopted by a General 
Assembly "vote of 121 in favor, none against and 7 
abstentions" 37 on June 28, 1994. To date, the document 
has been signed by over fifty states- "including the 
United States and virtually all other industrialized 
states. " 38 The agreement is a classic example of how 
envisioned cooperation must accommodate the power 
distribution in the international system. 
A number of significant changes were adopted and 
annexed to the 1982 Convention. Specifically, in the text 
of the 1982 Convention, decision making in the 
International Sea-Bed Authority (ISA) , the international 
organization charged with overseeing deep seabed mining, 
was to "be carried out by a one-nation, one-vote 
assembly. " 39 The 1994 agreement alters this process. 
Presently, it is necessary to seek the "collaboration of 
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the Council" before the decision of the assembly is 
approved. 40 Alone, this would not have provided the 
United States with additional power, because the Council 
did not guarantee a seat to the U.S. However, the 
'Agreement,' "guarantees a seat on the Council for 'the 
state, on the date of entry into force of the Convention, 
having the largest economy in terms of gross domestic 
product.' That state was the United States." 41 
The United States was also guaranteed a seat on the 
Finance Committee and a seat in the Council "chamber." 42 
These provisions further enhanced U.S. voting power and 
control over deep seabed mining. Additionally, the United 
States achieved success in getting production limits on 
the mining of manganese nodules lifted, 43 removing 
mandatory "technology transfers" from PART XI, 44 and 
curtailing the competitive advantage offered the 
Enterprise (the supranational mining company of the 
ISA) 45 
In 1982, pursuant to the text of Part XI, the 
distribution of revenues was to proceed via equitable 
distribution 
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taking into particular consideration the 
interests and needs of the developing States and 
peoples who have not attained full independence 
or other self-governing status. 46 
However, according to the 'Agreement,' any "surplus funds 
would be subject, ... to consensus in the Finance 
Committee. " 47 Since the United States was guaranteed a 
seat on the Finance Committee, their ability to deal with 
surplus revenues was enhanced. 
In the wake of these changes, the 1994 Agreement 
reinforced the maritime powers' preference to view the 
high seas and deep seabed as res nullius. The most 
notable articles in Part XI, aimed at formalizing the 
"common heritage of mankind" concept were rendered largely 
ineffective. According to one assessment, 
The 1994 Agreement substantially accommodates 
the objections of the United States and other 
industrial states to the deep seabed mining 
provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention. 
The Agreement embraces market-oriented policies 
and eliminates provisions identified as posing 
significant problems of principle and precedent, 
such as those dealing with production 
limitations, mandatory transfer of technology, 
and the review conference. It increases the 
influence of the United States and other 
industrial states in the Sea-Bed Authority, and 
reflects their longstanding preference for 
emphasizing interests, not merely numbers, in 
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the structure and voting arrangements of 
international organizations. 48 
The issues involved in deep seabed mining, and the 
historical events that brought the revised regime into 
existence, suggest that power, the primacy of the state, 
and the logic of self-help, remain important factors in 
international affairs. A neorealist explanation of deep 
seabed mining can off er insight into the behavior of 
states. 
To begin, the activities of powerful states in the 
system suggest that the primacy of the state is an ever 
present feature of the relations between states. As it 
became apparent in the 1950s and 1960s that a new set of 
rules to govern the oceans was necessary, the United 
Nations appeared to be the most feasible institution to 
use toward that end. When it provided logistical support 
and a neutral negotiating arena, the great powers did not 
object. After all, these functions of institutions cohere 
with the logic of self-help. However, as the U.N. began 
to be used to enhance LDC capabilities, relative to those 
of the great powers, cooperation broke down. 
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In order to achieve final agreement, it was necessary 
to return to the logic of self-help. This logic suggests 
that the maintenance of capabilities is an overriding 
concern. States, be they powerful or weak, will not enter 
agreements that diminish capabilities relative to others. 
Accordingly, the cooperative scheme that resulted 
maintains or enhances the capabilities for all states 
concerned. The financial and distributive arrangements in 
Part XI reflect the international power distribution. 
They do not require a diminution of state sovereignty, nor 
do they instill in the relevant international 
organizations an autonomous regulative or enforcement 
mechanism. 
Further, the position of the United States provides a 
good example of the need for hegemonic support. From the 
start, the U.S. was hesitant about Part XI. Since its 
economy and seabed mining capabilities are by far the 
largest, the United States would have had to contribute 
the greatest share. Not until the "envisioned 
cooperation" 49 of the U.N. and LDCs more closely matched 
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the level of cooperation predicted under anarchy did the 
position of the U.S. change. 
Finally, the perception of benefits from deep seabed 
mining changed from 1982 to 1994. By the time that the 
U.S. began to actively participate in the 'Agreement' 
negotiations, it was apparent that "the anticipated 
commercial mining of deep seabed minerals had receded into 
the twenty-first century." 50 As it had become less viable 
to mine the seabed, it became more viable for the U.S. to 
acquiesce to the modified Part XI. 
The extent of the cooperation in UNCLOS III suggests 
that self-help and cooperation are not incompatible. 
However, UNCLOS III, and in particular Part XI, also 
support the claim that cooperation must reflect the power 
distribution in the international system. The limits of 
cooperation with regard to Part XI and the annexed 
Agreement are examples of self-help logic and the drive to 
maintain capabilities. 
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OZONE DEPLETION: COOPERATION AS SELF-HELP 
Stratospheric ozone is an important component of the 
earth's atmosphere. Ozone has been found to act as a 
"global sunscreen," blocking harmful UV radiation from 
penetrating the earth's surface. 1 Early in 1974, 
scientists began to understand that chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFCs) had a devastating effect on the ozone layer. 2 
Previously, CFCs had been widely accepted as a non-toxic, 
cheap, and easily manufactured chemical product with wide-
spread domestic and industrial applications. 3 Invented in 
1928 by General Motors and DuPont, 4 their use as 
refrigerants, propellants, and cleaning agents was 
widespread and growing. 5 As the scientific data was 
inconclusive, and the potential economic impact from 
banning CFCs great, states did not act on the initial 
scientific findings. 
As reports estimating ozone loss continued to appear 
throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, and "doomsday" 
hypotheses were formulated, 6 states in the international 
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system grew more and more concerned. Evidence mounted 
that even modest losses in the ozone layer would cause 
increases in skin cancer, cataracts, and reduce the 
effectiveness of the human immune system.' The loss of 
ozone due to man-made CFCs had the potential to reduce 
state capabilities. Fearing this, many CFC producing and 
consuming states took unilateral action. The United 
States banned all non-essential CFC use in 1977. 8 Canada 
and many European states took similar steps. 9 
As concern grew, international institutions were 
called upon by states to coordinate scientific meetings 
and negotiating sessions. In March of 1977, the United 
States hosted a UNEP sponsored meeting of scientific 
experts and government officials. 1° From this meeting 
came the Coordinating Committee on Ozone Layer (CCOL) . 
This committee, meeting annually from 1977 until 1985, 
organized scientific information and prepared reports. 11 
Within eight years of the first domestic control 
measures, the largest group of CFC producers and consumers 
met in Vienna, Austria and signed the Vienna Convention 
for the Protection of the Ozone Layer. 12 As with UNEP's 
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previous "Conventions," Vienna provided the international 
community with a framework agreement to coordinate 
scientific missions and report findings. At the 
insistence of the "Toronto Group" (the United States, 
Canada, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Austria, and 
Switzerland), an amendment was added to the Vienna 
Convention enlisting the services of UNEP to begin 
consultations aimed at an additional protocol by 1987. 13 
Between 1985 and 1987, a number of important 
political and scientific events took place. In May of 
1985, the British Antarctic Survey, a scientific group 
stationed on Antarctica, published what would become known 
as the "ozone hole" paper. 14 This report detailed a loss 
of ozone of up to 40% over Antarctica. 15 Subsequent to 
this report, NASA published the result of its Nimbus 
satellite Antarctica mission. This report noted an ozone 
hole larger than the United States over Antarctica. 16 
Additionally, NASA studies in 1986 and 1987, along with 
WMO reports, confirmed ozone losses in the stratosphere. 17 
Politically, the presence of the United States became 
an important factor between 1985 and 1987. Having decided 
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on a coherent ozone policy in 1986, "the United States 
assumed a strong leadership role in the negotiations for 
the first time. 1118 By November of 1986, the U.S. position 
on ozone controls was announced, 
an immediate freeze in CFC consumption, followed 
by phased reductions to essentially zero 
(nominally, 95 percent reductions), with interim 
scientific reviews to determine whether the 
continued cuts were necessary. 19 
As the deadline for a protocol neared, it appeared 
that the U.S. was quite willing to flex its economic 
muscle and demonstrate its hegemonic position in the 
system. During 1987, domestic legislation was introduced 
calling for unilateral CFC reductions, and trade sanctions 
against those countries that did not follow the U.S. 
lead. 20 
Throughout the interim period between Vienna and the 
protocol, technological innovations occurred as well. 
DuPont, the world's largest CFC producer, began research 
into substitutes and announced that they would be 
available by the early 1990s. 21 Other industry leaders 
concurred and endorsed the idea of international 
controls. 22 
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The build-up of scientific, technical, and political 
events between 1985 and 1987, culminated in the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. 23 
This document, signed in September of 1987, committed 
parties to a freeze by 1990, 20% cuts by 1994, and a final 
production target of one-half 1986 levels. 24 These 
measures were accepted by all industrialized states and a 
number of LDCs before the protocol entered into force. 
Although time-lags are granted to developing states, at 
least two large developing states, Mexico and Brazil, have 
renounced the grace period. Citing the need "to keep up 
with their trading partners," 25 these states intend to 
follow the same phase-out dates as industrialized states. 
The two largest LDC states that produce CFCs, China and 
India, acquiesced to the international regime after 
pledges of money and technology. 26 
Following Montreal, a number of new scientific and 
technological issues became known. 27 As a result, tighter 
restrictions and more immediate phase-outs were introduced 
during negotiating sessions in London28 and Copenhagen. 29 
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Within two decades, the sovereign states of the world 
joined together and banned a popular and economically 
advantageous substance. Undeniably, 
The progress that was made, in dealing with an 
increasingly menacing global problem, 
particularly near the end of the 1980s, was 
indeed impressive. Few problems requiring state 
cooperation on a global scale move from bare 
recognition to something approaching solution in 
less than two decades. 30 
For the neorealist, the case of ozone depletion 
offers a classic example of "cooperation as self-help." 
No matter whether the state was developing or developed, 
powerful or weak, producing CFCs or merely consuming them, 
the potential harm from ozone depletion would affect it. 
The behavior of states in the international system appears 
to recognize this fact. 
Of particular interest is the position of the 
powerful states in the system. Many European states, 
including England and France, appear hesitant to alter 
their economic capabilities during the initial debate 
concerning ozone depletion. 31 As scientific knowledge 
increased concerning the cause and consequences of ozone 
damage, these states modified their respective positions. 
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Further, the influence that the United States had on these 
countries, appears to have contributed to their behavior. 
The coercive suggestion of trade sanctions, made by the 
U.S., may not have been the only factor in England and 
France's modified stance. However, it is perhaps wise to 
note that on two previous occasions, the 1977 aerosol ban 
and supersonic transport abandonment, 32 the United States 
acted unilaterally. The latter action was of great cost 
to England and France. 33 These actions should suggest 
that with regard to ozone depletion, the U.S. had a long 
history of concern. 
Certainly, the hegemonic position of the United 
States appears to have played a large role in the swift 
action that was taken on the matter. During the Vienna 
Convention, inclusion of the 'UNEP protocol amendment' was 
due in large part to a tough U.S. stance. 34 Further, even 
institutional theorists admit that "the final Protocol has 
a fairly strong American flavor. " 35 It can be said with 
some certainty, that had the United States not desired a 
quick and effective response to ozone depletion, the 
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matter would have remained unresolved for some time 
longer. 
Additionally, the position of the developing states 
is not unexpected and mirrors the hypothesized neorealist 
concern over the maintenance of capabilities. LDCs were 
at a real disadvantage during the early stages of the 
negotiations. Without the resources to develop and 
produce alternatives to CFCs, developing states were left 
little option but to continue to produce them. As it 
became clear that significant penalties would afflict them 
if they attempted to trade with CFC-alternative producing 
states, the LDCs lobbied for financial support. 36 
The response by the powerful states exhibits a 
remarkably rational approach to the ozone problem. A good 
example is the cost/benefit analysis contemplated by the 
United States. In 1986, officials estimated that almost 
one million U.S. citizens would be killed in the following 
ninety years due to ozone loss. 37 According to their 
figures, this would cost the United States approximately 
one point three trillion dollars in reduced economic 
capabilities. It would only cost about four billion 
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dollars in domestic transition costs to outfit the economy 
with CFC alternative technology. 38 As well, the cost to 
transition LDC states appeared considerably less than one 
point three trillion. The political outcome of the London 
Amendments offers some insight into these costs, 
London itself saw an extremely tense contest 
between, on the one hand, the determination of 
the major Southern states to get the best 
possible financial and technological terms for 
their participation and, on the other, Northern 
political determination to get the South on 
board without taking on vast and open-ended 
financial and technological commitments. The 
upshot was an agreement to establish a new fund, 
initially of $160-240 million (the difference 
being a $40 million tranche each for India and 
China if they acceded, as they eventually did), 
to be contributed by developed countries to help 
developing countries cease to use CFCs. 39 
Given the choice between continued ozone destruction and 
assisting LDCs, the approach by the United States the 
other powerful states appears well reasoned. Further, the 
acceptance of financial and technological rewards by the 
LDCs coheres with the logic of self-help. The LDCs, had 
they not transitioned to ozone-friendly chemical 
production, would have been left with an outdated and 
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inefficient technology. This would drastically alter 
economic development plans so crucial to LDC survival. 
The behavior of states surrounding the ozone issue 
represents an excellent example of how cooperation can be 
an important form of self-help. States in an anarchical 
system were confronted with a problem that required 
cooperation. In order to maintain capabilities, and thus 
ensure their survival, states found it in their interest 
to agree to a phase-out of an entire chemical group. 
Information presented to the states repeatedly confirmed 
that ozone depletion was caused by CFCs. Armed with 
knowledge of the cause and the effects, simple 
cost/benefit analyses resulted in substantial cooperation. 
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CLIMATE CHANGE: COMPROMISED CAPABILITIES 
In 1827, Jean Baptiste Fourier, a French scientist 
and mathematician, recognized that the earth's atmosphere 
traps the sun's energy just like a greenhouse. 1 Seventy 
years later, the Swedish scientist, Arrhenius, 
hypothesized that the burning of fossil fuels could 
potentially raise the temperature at the earth's surface. 2 
Little interest grew from the concerns of these 
scientists. Evidence to back their claims was not 
available. And, states were on the verge of rapid 
industrial expansion. 
Concern over greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions remained 
dormant until the 1970s. Throughout the past three 
decades, a steady increase in scientific data3 and public 
speculation4 has moved the climate change issue from 
relative obscurity to international prominence. Recent 
studies suggest that even small increases in the 
temperature of the earth can cause agricultural losses, 
sea level increases, and forest deterioration. 5 
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In order to deal with the possible threats caused by 
the catastrophic events of climate change, the United 
Nations General Assembly, in 1990, convened the 
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (INC) . 6 The INC mission was 
to develop a comprehensive umbrella convention to deal 
with climate change concerns by the time the 1992 United 
Nations Conference on the Environment and Development 
(UNCED) convened in Rio de Janeiro. 7 Although the INC 
managed to accomplish its task, 
the Convention was a disappointment: despite 
early hopes that it would seek to stabilize or 
even reduce emissions of greenhouse gases by 
developed countries, the Convention contains 
only the vaguest of commitments regarding 
stabilization and no commitment at all on 
reductions. 8 
Unlike the pressing matters in UNCLOS III and 
stratospheric ozone depletion, climate change is "not only 
distant in time but fraught with uncertainty as to its 
possible consequences.n 9 For the majority of states in 
the international system, including all of the powerful 
states, climate change does not automatically entail a 
reduction in state capability. Indeed, Russia 
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acknowledged that some benefits might befall it if small 
increases in the global surface temperature resulted from 
GHG consumption. 10 Increases in food production would be 
likely to occur in China, Russia, and Canada as growing 
seasons increased. 11 For the United States, "estimates by 
the Environmental Protection Agency show that the net 
effect on agriculture is uncertain, with the possible 
range of effects lying between a net gain of $10 billion 
and a net loss of $10 billion." 12 
After studying all the potential costs associated 
with global warming (including agricultural losses, sea 
level increases, forest loss, and an increase in the need 
to seek cooler environments) Wilfred Beckerman concluded, 
it seems impossible to escape the conclusion 
that even under pessimistic assumptions, the 
annual cost to the world as a whole of global 
warming associated with a doubling of C02 
concentrations is likely to be almost negligible 
by comparison with the value of world output 
over the period in question.u 
For only a handful of relatively weak and powerless 
states do the concerns of significant climate change 
appear to matter. The most active group of states in the 
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early negotiations, was the Alliance of Small Island 
States. 14 According to Oran Young, 
This bloc brings together about two dozen island 
states in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the 
Caribbean and Mediterranean Seas, as well as a 
few others (for example, Bangladesh) likely to 
be hardest hit by rising sea levels resulting 
from global warming. 15 
This group attracted the support of scientific 
organizations and advisors. 16 Because of this support, 
Young contends that the Alliance "has proven effective in 
climate negotiations, despite the weakness of its members 
in material terms. " 17 Neorealists would expect nothing 
less. Confronted with an environmental issue that would 
significantly undermine a state's capabilities, and 
possibly its very survival, states would be expected to 
use all means available to them. 
What is significant about the Alliance is not its 
ability to lobby effectively in the negotiations, but 
rather its inability to lobby for a series of important 
articles in the final Convention. Here, power politics 
once again dictates the behavior of states. The 
Convention does nothing to create an 'insurance fund,' 
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something that the Alliance desired in order to compensate 
affected states for an increase in sea levels due to 
GHGs. 18 Instead, the Convention offers a non-legal 
remedy, noting that the 
Parties shall give full consideration to what 
actions are necessary ... to meet the specific 
needs and concerns of developing country Parties 
arising from the adverse effects of climate 
change and/or the impact of the implementation 
of response measures. 19 
With only a tacit guarantee of 'full consideration,' 
the Alliance achieved no legal means to ensure 
compensation for GHG damages. Further, the Alliance was 
ecstatic that Article 4(4) was included in the 
Convention. 20 This article was perceived as a major 
victory because it states 
the developed country Parties ... shall also 
assist the developing country Parties that are 
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects 
of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation 
to those adverse effects. 21 
However, there is no mention of a particular degree 
of funding22 and "Parties seeking aid for adaptation costs 
may have difficulty proving causation." 23 The effects of 
GHGs are extremely slow, and the scientific information 
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collected to date is inconclusive. Alliance members may 
be disappointed in the victory that article 4(4) provides 
them. 
The next clue that offers evidence of the 
Convention's limited ability to enjoin cooperation is the 
position of the United States on the issue of climate 
change. It is unclear how important the most prosperous 
and powerful nation in the system considered the climate 
change issue. As the world-wide fervor over climate 
change increased throughout the 1980s, the United States 
instigated the creation of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) , 24 hosted the first meeting of the 
INC, 25 and pledged financial support for developing 
countries. 26 
However, other actions by the United States provide 
evidence that climate change was not perceived as a 
certain and debilitating threat. Throughout the 
negotiations, the United States resisted setting carbon 
dioxide targets and timetables. 2' These issues "were 
perhaps the most controversial in the entire 
negotiation. " 28 The United States, not convinced of the 
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scientific findings, 29 felt it was "premature, rigid, and 
inequitable" 30 to establish strict targets and timetables. 
Instead, the US argued that the Convention 
should adopt a 'bottom-up' approach that 
encourages the development of better 
information, national strategies, and actions 
plans. 31 
The U.S. also made several statements to the effect 
that they were unwilling to subsidize LDC efforts to 
control GHG emissions. 32 Rather, the U.S. desired that 
LDCs apply to the General Environment Facility {GEF) for 
funding. The GEF is controlled by the World Bank, managed 
by developed states, and funded by voluntary donations. 33 
Finally, many of the developing nations placed 
economic development before environmental concerns. 
Signaling a desire to maintain present capabilities, the 
developing states were not willing to forego economic 
development. 'Myopic' self-interest34 appears to dominate 
the LDC cost/benefit analysis. With limited resources 
available, and myriad other problems to deal with, 35 LDCs 
were reluctant to deal with a long-term, and possibly non-
existent, environmental problem. 
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A desire to ensure survival, along with an 
uncertainty concerning environmental degradation as a 
result of climate change, lessened the salience of this 
issue. No overwhelmingly powerful blocs formed. Unlike 
UNCLOS III negotiations, a North-South divide did not 
develop. The United States remained skeptical of the 
scientific data and considered the costs of reducing C02 
emissions far too high. Wilfred Beckerman examines this 
issue, 
a 50 per cent cut in world emissions would need 
a tax that would yield revenue in the USA alone 
of at least $100 billion. The USA, which is 
usually very reluctant to hand over relatively 
trivial sums to the World Bank and other aid 
agencies, would never agree to handing over this 
ammount, which is about one hundred times the 
current budget of the United Nations, to some 
international agency to hand out to developing 
countries for carbon abatement! And there must 
be great doubts whether any international 
agreement will get off the ground in the absense 
of USA support, if not leadership. 36 
Other powerful states were similarly hesitant. 
England was wary of prescribing C02 targets, and often 
frustrated other EC states like Germany. 37 Developing 
states were also split. Energy producing states, like 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, were against higher taxes on GHG 
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emissions. 38 China desired only a framework convention. 39 
India appeared more interested in receiving financial 
benefits like those won during the ozone negotiations. 40 
In contrast, the Netherlands, the 'Alliance,' and many 
African states, all potential victims of global warming, 
wanted immediate reductions and financial support. 41 
The paltry concessions at UNCED represent the 
uneasiness that states have with the climate change issue. 
Without concrete scientific knowledge, neither developed 
nor developing states were willing to take appreciable 
losses on short-term economic plans in order to reduce GHG 
emissions. The over-riding logic of the self-help system 
resulted in few gains for weak states with the most to 
lose, and no real losses for powerful states with little 
to gain. In the aftermath of the Rio Convention, no 
further protocols have been developed and no international 
negotiations have taken place, 
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CONCLUSION 
Among many in the field of international relations 
there is an uncontrollable urge to view the nation-state 
as locked in a desperate and losing struggle for its very 
existence. As natural resources are depleted, pollution 
levels increase, and the global population of the human 
species swells, theorists and lay people alike predict the 
quiet end of the state-centric era. Regimes, 
institutions, and international organizations are 
perceived as new and vibrant forces in the global struggle 
for survival. No longer is the international system run 
by the rules of state sovereignty and power politics, and 
conditioned by the overwhelming consequences of anarchy. 
Much like the 1970s, when theorists foresaw the 
inevitable economic interdependence of states, 1 an 
ecological interdependence has gripped the imagination of 
scholars and statesmen. The state system is thus 
considered incapable of dealing with global environmental 
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issues. It is now necessary to cede authority to regimes 
and institutions for the earth. 
This characterization of the current intellectual 
climate in international politics bodes well for theorists 
of the institutional persuasion. Moreover, the increasing 
numbers, and wide-spread support for, international legal 
instruments and regimes provides evidence for just such a 
world view. 
Since the birth of neorealism in 1979, a steady 
stream of scholarly works has attempted to provide the 
discipline with structural explanations of polarity and 
the power dimension involved in the international 
political economy. These works contradict much of the 
logic detailed above. Instead of witnessing an increase 
in global interdependence, a diminution of state 
sovereignty, and a reduction in the use of power politics, 
theorists from this persuasion insist that the nation-
state system is thriving. 
Often ignoring environmental problems, or relegating 
their importance to the status of 'low politics,' 
neorealists have concentrated on the dynamics of global 
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strategic issues. The reluctance to sufficiently explain 
environmental cooperation through the lens of neorealism 
does a disservice, not only to the paradigm, but to the 
discipline of international relations. 
This project has examined the merits of applying 
neorealist theory to environmental issues. Using the same 
principles involved in understanding strategic matters, 
this endeavor demonstrates that neorealism can 
sufficiently explain environmental cooperation. 
The strict neorealist reliance on the competitive 
marketplace has been removed. In its place, a more 
balanced discussion of the logic of self-help remains. 
Here, cooperation exists as a useful and necessary 
component of self-help strategies. To supplement the 
drive to survive, three principles necessary for 
successful environmental cooperation have been 
highlighted. First, the primacy of the state remains a 
central tenet of neorealism. Second, agreements to 
protect the global environment must mirror the power 
distribution in the international system. When that 
system contains a hegemon, its support is often crucial. 
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Finally, states, because of a desire to maintain 
capabilities, will continue to rationally weigh the costs 
of cooperating with the benefits that that cooperation 
provides. 
The presence of these principles have been 
demonstrated in the eventual outcome of UNCLOS III and 
ozone protection. States instigated, controlled, and 
finally accepted a number of policy options to govern 
their behavior. In keeping with the neorealist need to 
account for the power distribution in the system, these 
agreements were molded to reflect great power desires. 
The role of the United States, as a world hegemon, is of 
particular importance. The U.S. successfully led the 
revolt against LDC efforts in Part XI and coerced and 
influenced world states to accept many of the ozone 
provisions. 
The lack of two of these principles in the climate 
change matter, effectively abolished current hopes of 
substantial cooperation to reduce GHG emissions. Although 
the state remained the primary actor, it appeared that 
cost/benefit analyses favored non-cooperation for a 
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majority of states. The power distribution in the system 
is reflected in the final "symbolic" agreement, but was 
not reflected in the negotiations. Few of the powerful 
actors appeared interested in substantially curtailing 
emissions. The United States considered the costs of GHG 
reductions to be extremely high. Further, those states 
with the most at stake, are some of the least powerful 
states in the international system. 
A structural explanation of environmental cooperation 
suggests that power, anarchy, the state, and self-help 
logic, remain important principles in international 
relations. That this is the case is certainly welcome 
news for neorealism. However, it also provides hope that 
engendering cooperation can be better understood. Being 
cognizant of the need to protect the global environment 
and remaining realistic about the type and extent of the 
cooperation possible will allow for more successful 
environmental cooperation. 
Although it is beyond the scope of this endeavor, it 
is important to analyze a greater number of international 
environmental agreements. The three case studies that 
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were outlined in this exercise involve global 
environmental problems. Further work should examine 
regional environmental matters, including both 
multilateral and bilateral agreements to protect the 
environment. Regional examples provide insight into the 
factors necessary for regional cooperation. 
It is also necessary to develop a more thorough 
definition of the 'state' in international politics. With 
an increase in the number of non-governmental 
organizations and multinational corporations, comes a 
desire to alter the effectiveness of the state. There is 
also a desire to 'open the box' and peer into the 
apparatus of the state. The structural definition of 
environmental cooperation outlined above relies on a 
picture of the state as a rational unitary actor. To 
avoid reductionism, the state must be seen as maintaining 
or enhancing its capabilities. Therefore, internal 
attributes must assumed away. When this is done 
effectively, a structural explanation of environmental 
cooperation appears to work. Further inquiry into the 
state may help alleviate the desire to 'open the box.' 
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The politics of international environmental issues 
are complex and complicated. They require the active 
participation of many state actors and potentially involve 
every citizen in every state. The importance of a safe 
environment has never been questioned. What has been 
questioned is the ability of states to work together to 
provide a safe environment. A better understanding of the 
motivations of states and the complexity of environmental 
issues allows for a more realistic account of future 
international cooperation. 
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